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Philosophy and the Mixed Race Experience

Edited and Introduced by Tina Fernandes Botts

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Responsible Multiracial Politics¹
with a new postscript, Chasing Mixed-Race Ghosts

Ronald Robles Sundstrom

AMBIGUITY, CONFLICT, AND HOPE

The ambiguities and conflicts around personal, and the emergent political and group-based, multiracial identity are the result of the inherent ambiguities and inconsistencies within national and colonial systems of race.² These ambiguities and inconsistencies, and outright errors disguised as racial science, were compounded by migration, trade, and other contacts—an active process which is at the heart of today's browning of America. Multiracial lives have been living signs of the profound errors of all racial systems, in their vain attempt to categorize, sort, order, and control. Multiracial lives were from the first days of modern race theories ruptures of racial mores, and they remain so at some social sites today. There is, however, a vast gulf between the common belief, which held for the majority of the history of race in the United States, that multiracial persons were "mongrels" and degenerations, and the ubiquity of celebratory images multiracial persons and families that are now common. Multiracial identity has evolved, in the post-civil rights decades, into an identity in rebellion against monoracialism, yet it remains the target of racist fears just as it develops its own form of racial privilege.

Multiracial identity is, as its defenders have asserted, a psychologically and socially difficult identity to live with: multiracial individuals must struggle for recognition in a society that does not fully welcome or officially acknowledge their existence.³ Likewise, the assertion of multiracial identity in the form that it presently takes in the United States is possible only as a result of a shift in dominant racial projects that have allowed, and favor, the emergence of a distinct multiracial identity and political advocacy movement, the flourishing of which may come at the expense of traditional civil rights goals—arguments, significantly, that dominate legal critical race theory discussions of these matters.⁴

This chapter revisits both sides of the debate, especially in light of the role of multiracialism in the browning of America. The next section investigates how multiracialism is a target for liberals and those on the Left who are opposed to the institutionalization and spread of multiracial identity because of its affects on the demographics of traditionally dominant American delineated ethnoracial groups and on civil rights policy. The third section turns to the manipulation of multiracialism by neoconservatives, and the careless actions of some multiracialist organizations that allowed their demands for multiracial recognition to be associated with Neoconservative color-blind policy agendas. The fourth and fifth sections investigate the charge of racism against multiracialism—a powerful charge that directly contradicts and threatens the utopian-racial-harmony vision some associate with the browning of America. The sixth section explores the worries about the expansion of multiracial recognition beyond the census to public schools, colleagues, and universities, and it presents and supports arguments in favor of the expansion of multiracialism. The chapter ends with a re-conceptualization of multiracial identity as an identity and a movement that are called to repair (i.e., to act responsibly in the face of racism, to remember the history of race and the American family, and to engage in restorative justice in a society damaged by racism).⁵ Multiracial persons, and the movement that claims to look after their interests, have special obligations that are rooted in the very experience that leads individuals to claim this identity: their obligation to memory. The demands of memory lead us to seek repair, yet they also demand that multiracialism contribute to the repair of the damage wrought by racism.

CRUEL AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE REBUKES

The criticism that multiracial, or mixed race, is an impossible identity or that multiracialism is simply a variant of racial passing available to the brown are cruel.⁶ They are cruel because they dismiss the particular experiences of multiracial persons and preclude any possibility of the existence and legitimacy of multiracial identity. Their intention is to foster incredulity about the intentions of person who dare claim multiracial identity, and to code multiracialism as simple racist betrayal. These liberal and Leftist critics of multiracialism wrongfully perceive themselves as allies of racial justice, and are unfortunately engaged in the sad project of silencing debate through cruel rebukes and denying the possibility of multiracial life.

The intention behind criticisms of multiracialism is to expose the interactions, perhaps necessary or intentional, between multiracialism and personal, social, and institutional racism; another aim is to warn off those who may be tempted to identify with multiracialism. It is a curious

strategy, because the critics use cruelty to appeal for loyalty, but their rhetoric merely drives those who most closely identify with multiracialism away.

What, then, is the political or racial project of the criticism of multiracialism? To absolutely associate multiracial identity with racist betrayal is akin to labeling so-called “illegitimate” children as bastards. Will calling a group of fatherless children “bastards” make them any more legitimate? Given the self-destructiveness of the rhetoric that many of the most vociferous critics of multiracialism deploy, their strategy cannot be to engender loyalty; rather, it is a politics driven by a post-civil rights version of racial-sexual-moral panic.⁷ Their racial project is a demand for political and social authenticity, while their political one is recrimination and revenge—it is, at its base, the repetition of the language of absolute loyalty plus the threat of disowning and exclusion that has historically marked the ruptures around multiracialism.

In contrast to those claims, critics that explore the relationship of multiracialism to personal racism are respectable as they raise serious moral and political concerns about the choices of individuals acting within networks of racial projects.⁸ Similarly respectable are the investigations of how multiracial identity, whether rooted in personal racism or not, interacts with racist systems and institutions. Both of these streams of vital critique allow for the possibility of rectification, reparation, and restoration. What must be avoided is insisting on the nonexistence or moral irretrievability of multiracialism.

Multiracial identity is an identity borne of specific experiences of being born into, and living among, the gaps of racial and ethnic categories.⁹ It is a category of people who are the result, on one hand, of numerous ruptures of racial mores, and on the other, the implications and policies of those very same mores. Race was imagined to designate deep, permanent, and impermeable barriers between varieties of peoples; yet, racial systems have consistently been accompanied by an erotic imaginary of miscegenation, and of course its widespread practice. There is a third element, though, that must be added to the dyad: the mulatto/as and mestizo/as that resulted from these ruptures and utilizations have been the object of curiosity, denial, and terror. For the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century race theory, white initiated interracial sex was privately recognized but publicly denied, and the children of miscegenation were mysterious.¹⁰

In stark contrast to the territories influenced by the power of Spain and France and the official racial systems of South Africa and Brazil, there has been little space for the expression of multiracial identity in the history of race in the United States, although the identity cannot be said to have been absent. The “one-drop-of-blood” rule for African Americans and the blood-quantum rules for Native Americans more or less guaranteed that any black-white offspring would be black, and red-white off-

spring would be white.¹¹ This is the backdrop only by which the phenomena of passing, which is distinct from the claiming of multiracial identity, or the ostracism of the racially ambiguous in the United States, can be understood. Despite, however, the widespread adoption of *de facto* and *de jure* rules to guard whiteness from specifically black inclusion, recognition of multiracialism from within and without racial and ethnic communities proliferated. Social and legal institutions in large part did not allow for an independent multiracial identity and category, yet the recognition of multiracial genealogy and experience has always been present.¹²

The critics of multiracialism are quick to recognize the presence of multiracial individuals as part of so-called monoracial, non-white communities. The recognition, however, of multiracial genealogy and experience in the history of race in America has been the cause for much of confusion in current debates, as well as the failure to properly distinguish between having multiracial genealogy and experiencing one's self and life as being multiracial. Critics argue that multiracialism is superfluous: "African American" and "Native American" already include those who are "mixed," those whose genealogy includes white ancestors—white ancestors, and families, who are largely ignorant of, or deny, familial connections.¹³ In fact, in the cases of African Americans and Native Americans, the majority of these monoracial communities have multiracial genealogies.

A corollary argument is that there are no ontological grounds for the existence of multiracial identity as a separate identity or category. Race is real at any particular site, because it results from a variety of social forces, at those sites, that place social and political meanings on bodies. In the United States, and in the black case, in particular, those forces have coded all persons with any black ancestry (and socially determined black phenotypes) as exclusively black.¹⁴ The American racial project, with few exceptions, has identified multiracial individuals as members of a single race. Although race in the United States experienced significant changes, there has been no serious alteration in the racial formation of blackness; thus, there is no justification for a multiracial category. Thus, there is no reason to label, for example, the child of a black-white union multiracial because the black (and probably the white) parent is already multiracial.

These arguments support the request, made by legal critical race theorists who criticize the multiracial movement, that multiracial persons keep their mixture a private matter and not ask the state or its institutions to make their mixture a matter of public record.¹⁵ The movement for official recognition of multiracial identity in statistics is best understood, according to these critics, as a movement toward white privilege, and a betrayal of civil-rights.

The request that multiracial individuals go in the "closet" with their identity is stunning. First, the mere counting of multiracial individuals,

who under present guidelines are counted when they check more than one racial or ethnic "box," does not necessarily undermine the collection of data needed to enforce civil rights policies. Second, the demand that multiracials hide themselves from view in the public sphere amounts to a "don't ask, don't tell" multiracial policy. It advocates the application of a public-private distinction in personal identity, for the sake of accomplishing traditional civil rights goals. This demand goes hand in hand with, and would support, the restriction of public discussions of racial justice to a narrow realm of "public" affairs: jobs, income, wealth, housing, healthcare, education, and so on, which are the large-scale distributive ends of civil rights policy. Off the table would be public discussions of changes in individual identity, family structure, and the implications of the browning of America for the future of civil rights policy. Public discussions of race and the private sphere would be kept out of the realm of public discourse, on such topics as interracial intimacy, multiracial identity, interracial adoption, and the effects of racial identity in custody claims of dissolved unions—discussions that are vital to have in a browning America.¹⁶ As with the "don't ask, don't tell" policy for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in the United States military, such a multiracial policy effectively ignores demographic reality (there are homosexuals in the military, and there are multiracials in America), refuses to recognize a category of people that morally deserve recognition while benefiting from their presence, and refuses to deal with fundamental shifts in American social life.¹⁷ Lastly, the "don't ask, don't tell" demand is stunning because it so brazenly employs the private-public distinction to remove multiracialism from politics, from public life—a distinction that has been the target of decades of arguments by feminists and race theorists. On one hand, it recognizes the growing trend of multiracial self-recognition, but on the other, it asserts that multiracial persons as such are not morally or politically entitled to public recognition. As with the refusal to consider differences of social identities by liberals who support strict neutrality or blindness to social differences, "don't ask, don't tell" multiracial policies imperiously refuse to deal with intra-communal difference, and simply demand silence.

Further, "don't ask, don't tell" arguments suppose that multiracialism is primarily tied to genealogy, and with that supposition the emergence of multiracial as an individual identity and a political movement is involved in many of the problems its critics have enumerated. The largest problems have to do with the ontology of race: if there are no races, then there are no multiracial individuals. Race, though, is understood as a social concept, and belonging to one or another race is largely though not exclusively tied to racialized genealogy. Racial genealogy is not democratic, as the different races are not considered by widely held social mores and legal practices to mix equally (e.g., the one-drop-of-blood rule). Thus, racial categories already include those of mixed genealogies.

Moreover, the genealogy of individuals admits of a high degree of mixture. Thus, either we are all multiracial, or, really, none of us are.

The supposition that multiracial identity is a genealogical claim is false. It is significant that both the proponents and opponents of multiracialism make this error. Multiracialism cannot be largely a genealogical matter; rather, it is an experience. Multiracial activists and organizations that base multiracial identity on simple genealogy do grave damage to their own cause, by reinforcing absurd and discounted simplistic biological conceptions of race and standards of racial purity. Likewise, those who criticize multiracialism by merely pointing to past patterns of racial categorization fundamentally do not understand—or just have not listened to accounts of—post-Civil Rights era multiracial identity formation.¹⁸

A preponderance of accounts in art, literature, autobiography, and social science demonstrate several variants of the multiracial experience that stretch back to the birth of the concept of race.¹⁹ Denying the existence of multiracial experience, and thus multiracial identity, is patently false and absurd; it is, as has been said, cruel. Likewise, denying the existential validity of the form it takes today simply because of its past forms is not serious argument. Each multiracial experience is tied to a particular site—to a particular network of social forces that give the identity presence and effect—rendering it distinct.²⁰

Yesteryear's Octoroon is not today's Hapa. Although there has been little possibility in pre-1960s America of a multiracial identity that was separable from a traditional racial category, there have been significant shifts in social practices, mores, laws (in short, social forces) that have opened up enough social and conceptual space for such a category. Hence, *X* born in 1950, and whose parents were white and black, was considered by her family, friends, strangers, and herself to be simply black, even though she was largely recognized as a mulatta or in popular parlance, "redbone." *X* falls in love with a white person *Y*, and in 1980 they have a child, *Z*, together. *Z* faces racial and ethnic pressures similar to *X*, but as *Z* exists in a distinct site, she faces different degrees of those forces as well as wholly new forces. *Z*'s experience of race is distinct, and she has an option that *X* never did: she can reasonably declare that she identifies as both black and white and considers herself multiracial. *X* never could reasonably claim to be multiracial. After the 1980s, *X* and *Z* both experience the loosening of racial mores, but *Z* can internalize and identify with these shifts in a way that was unavailable or incomprehensible to *X*. Multiracialism, then, is linked to interplays between genealogy, social forces, and the phenomenology of race.

Accusations of bad faith or betrayal are directed toward multiracialism for different reasons and from a variety of directions. Ruptures mark the experience and presence of multiracial life. Multiracial individuals are living symbols of the rupture of racial-sexual mores and divisions.

These ruptures are alive, for better or worse, in all of our families and communities. The difficulty with which white family structures deal with non-whiteness within is now a well-told tale; the tragic stories of ostracism and denial are as old as this nation—indeed they are story in this nation's myth of political and social origins (e.g., Thomas Jefferson's relation with Sally Hemmings).²¹ Latino, Native-, African-, and Asian-American families have to various degrees similar stories of ostracism and denial.

These stories, at once personal, familial, and social, resulted in a variety of personal choices: from the most painful choice of passing, to the contemporary declaration of multiracialism. Each of these stories carries the signs of personal-familial-social rupture. The personal expression of multiracial experience, whether racist or not, interacts with the social processes, the various racial projects, responsible for racial formation in the United States. Therefore, as the dominant racial projects connect the everyday with macro-level processes, there is a looping-effect, or a network of mutual support between racial formations on each level. The ruptures around multiracialism are transitive across the personal, familial, and social.

Each of these sites of rupture must be addressed by the work of repair that multiracialism should accomplish. These ruptures do not necessitate the shunning of multiracial identity or the dismantling of the multiracial movement, but they do entail responsible commitments and action in the face of these personal and social challenges. Has the multiracial movement engaged its issues in the spirit of repair?

If writings from the critics of multiracialism are the gauge, then the multiracial movement offers nothing more than shrill and sustained screams for multiracial identity and multiracial family identity. Certainly, some in the multiracial movement (e.g., Project Race) have offered such protests. Although their actions are understandable in the face of existential denial and assumptions of personal racism, their unfortunate tactics represent intransigence and the assertion of disconnected individuality. Calls for recognition are not by themselves acts of repair.

Yet, a careful look at the history of multiracial advocacy shows that much of their activity has been characterized by the desire for repair as well as recognition.²² It is as if the critics of multiracialism do not bother to notice this facet of the movement, and have been uncharitable and hyperbolic.²³ There is a tactic, as I shall argue below, that is counter-productive and inconsistent with their political aims.

COLOR-BLINDNESS AND MULTIRACIAL PRIVILEGE

Those who bear multiracial identity are relieved to various degrees of the social forces that subject their monoracial, and often darker, relations. It

would be unfair to call their lives easier, for they live their own particular racial hardships, but they do escape some of the norms that discipline, limit, and degrade monoracial individuals. The social space they exist in, then, opens up opportunities not available otherwise: for example, judgments of their "accessible" and "exotic" beauty, or judgments of their character and normalcy based on their "mixed" characteristics; they may even have the possibility of passing. At worst, multiracial identity may be an identity based in racial opportunism that depends on anti-black racism, as well as class and racial privilege.

These complaints, however, are too focused on individuals and personal choices. Indeed, the debate suffers from an overwhelming focus on the whether or not the personal assertion of multiracial identity is racist and whether the multiracial movement is motivated by the racism of its leadership. As Paul Spickard has commented, individualism has a "stunning" predominance in the discourse on both sides.²⁴

The intentions of individuals are an important issue, and will be investigated below, but more important is the way in which multiracial identity may interact with American racial politics and macro-level processes. Multiracialism may participate in and contribute to social and institutional racism. On this point the dominant worries, of course, have been expressed about the national census and other public records closely linked (such as K-12 and college enrollment and admission forms).

Additionally, multiracialism has been adopted by the proponents of naïve color-blindness in their pursuit of law and policy scrubbed free of any reference to, and influence of, race and ethnicity. Now, there is an obvious trajectory from the politics of the American Left to support for the multiracialism, a line of descent from *Loving v. Virginia* to the 1997 congressional hearing on "Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census."²⁵ Just as obvious is the appeal of multiracialism for American neoconservatives.

Neoconservatives, and others on the Right, such as right-leaning libertarians, see in the multiracial movement what they extrapolate from Frederick Douglass or Martin Luther King, Jr.: statements of one America. We should no more fault the multiracial movement, than we do Douglass or King, for the Right's adoption or manipulation of them. Certainly there has been cooperation between a Republican majority and the movement. The 1997 hearings on the 2000 census, which were held to determine whether a "multiracial" category would be included as an identity option, were held under the aegis of the Republican leadership of the House. There is no reason to believe that a Democratic majority would have prevented the hearings. In particular much has been made by the critics of the multiracial movement of the support of the former-Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R-GA).²⁶

Gingrich did support the addition of a multiracial category, but so did several Democrats. It is a marker of viciousness of the debate that Gra-

ham has been lambasted for praising Gingrich for his aid; those criticisms contain intentional misinterpretations and distortions of her praise for Gingrich. Graham's critics do not mention her praise for President Clinton's support or her overall point that the hearings were a bipartisan effort.²⁷

What Gingrich wrote, though, does demonstrate why the Right has appropriated, although without much cash or real support, the multiracial cause. According to Gingrich, multiracialism is a positive demographic, social, and political, development because it leads to a whole American identity. Citing the history of ethnic assimilation and, Gingrich states,

I think we need to be prepared to say, the truth is we want all Americans to be, quite simply, Americans. That doesn't deprive anyone of the right to further define their heritage. . . . It doesn't deprive us of the right to ethnic pride, to have some sense of our origins. But it is wrong for some Americans to begin creating subgroups to which they have a higher loyalty than to America at large.²⁸

Gingrich ends with an appeal for the multiracial category as a way of ceasing to force Americans into "inaccurate" and "divisive" subgroups; ultimately, as he testified in his writing, this is a step toward the ideal of having but "one box on federal forms that simply reads: 'American'." The Right's support for multiracialism, however, largely derives its opposition to color-conscious civil rights laws (it is not opposed to being conscious about color when it suit its own agenda).

The stated support of multiracialism by George Will and Ward Connerly is closely linked to their opposition to color-conscious programs, and in particular, to affirmative action.²⁹ The pro-multiracialism and anti-Affirmative Action activism on the Right are closely linked; this link is most directly visible in the rhetoric and activism of Ward Connerly. Connerly's successful efforts to pass California Proposition 209 and his failed efforts on both the California Proposition 54, as well as including "multiracial" on University of California forms, are, in his mind, one project.³⁰ The organizations he has lead, the American Civil Rights Institute and the Racial Privacy Initiative, each represent the dual directions of his anti-civil rights color-blind agenda.³¹

Connerly, along with other black conservatives (e.g., Thomas Sowell and Shelby Steele), disagrees with the principle of race-consciousness that has been securely part of the black freedom struggle since Du Bois's "The Conservation of Races." For Connerly, and other neoconservatives, appeals to race and racism are less explanations of non-white social disadvantage rather, than obstacles to assimilation and excuses for individual and group failure. Color-blindness, understood as strict racial neutrality, then, is a remedy as well as ideal; it is a remedy for the many ways that race and appeals to racism have plagued communities of color, espe-

cially Latino/as and African Americans.³² It is amusing, then, that Connerly and his allies appeal to the very tool they disparage: they demand that government institutions be color-conscious, that is, of multiracialism, to achieve the general eradication of all racial categories. As Gingrich expressed it, multiracialism is the path to the singular communal conception of "American."

The Gingrich-Connerly example displays how multiracialism converges with naïve versions of color-blindness. Multiracialism, in some forms, is simply hostile to the collection of any racial data. As an element of that anti-race hostility, it may obfuscate the importance of race by falsely signifying the end of racism. Beyond such political posturing, multiracialism may contravene civil rights programs by obfuscating the census count of traditional racial categories; likewise, it may deny those groups members and thus lessen their political clout and be utilized as a step toward color-blindness in law and policy.³³ Beyond, though, mere frightful possibilities, is the present fact that the Racial Privacy Initiative (RPI) was explicitly used to support the end of race-conscious policies, such as affirmative action.

Just as with the browning of America, Multiracialism may seem at first glance to run counter to color-blindness; it is, after all, about the recognition of the proliferation of colors. Yet precisely because of this proliferation, opponents of color-conscious law and policy find in the multiracial movement ideological support for naïve versions of color-blindness.

PERSONAL RACISM

The initial complaint against multiracialism is that personal racism motivates the adoption of the identity. Those who would adopt and declare that identity are doing so because of their racist beliefs against the non-white communities whom they are associated with through genealogy. The motivating racist beliefs may involve beliefs, explicitly or unconsciously held, that the relevant non-white groups are inferior or antipathetic.³⁴ Likewise, if a nondoxastic model of racism is the guide, the racist belief plus the discriminatory act of choosing a "multiracial" identity (a label that is either inherently racist or has such effects) is what makes its adoption racist.³⁵

There is little evidence for the charge of explicit personal racism although some critics offer anecdotal evidence gathered from the ill-considered remarks of a few of the principle figures of the multiracial movement.³⁶ Certainly, personal racism was part of the psychological dynamics of those who participated in passing, an activity and choice that can be ascribed to what has been called internalized racism. It is unwarranted,

however, to read the site-specific motivations of those who passed, and who are still passing, into the current multiracial movement.

A response to this reply points to the function of multiracialism: i.e., to open what Deglar called the "mulatto escape hatch," thus providing an individual solution to racism, and reinforcing racism (how it does so is dependent on the site).³⁷ If a person is not already white, then it is better to be mixed than not; similarly, multiracial identity reinforces the social racist belief that it is better to be partially white than non-white.

That multiracial identity functions this way, however, is not sufficient to charge self-declaring multiracial individuals with personal racism. Nonetheless, insofar as the declaration of multiracial identity discriminates against non-white groups, we can hold multiracial individuals and such movements accountable for their participation in social and institutional racist harm.

SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RACISM

The symbiosis of multiracialism with racism is displayed in four ways: First, multiracial identities exist because race theories have constructed non-white identities as inherently inferior and antipathetic. Second, it provides an individual solution to racist oppression that not only fails to question racist social structure, but also depends and profits from that structure. Third, it is a vehicle of individual and communal declaration that reinforces all three types of racism. Fourth, it sets up a multiracial group—the colored or mestizo/as—as a buffer zone that protects whiteness by ensconcing it within a protective class of brown folk who seek white privilege via the mulatto escape hatch.³⁸

These claims are thought to be supported by referencing the history of passing in the United States and multiracial identity in South African and Brazil. If multiracialism functions in any of these four ways, then it is certainly accurate to accuse it of supporting social and institutional racism. The problem with this objection, though, is that there is no evidence that any of these four processes are occurring in the United States on a level that is comparable to Brazil or South Africa.³⁹ While there may be, even today, non-whites who chose to pass as white, today's passing is not like yesteryear's: being white need not involve the absolute denial of all non-white ancestry. All the same, passing in the United States, or the self-declaration of multiracial identity, hardly adds up to a "buffer zone."

The charge of social and institutional racism can still be pressed against the multiracial movement by detailing how the movement may play into the hands of conservatives opposed to civil rights legislation by supporting color-blind policy, law, and judicature. Harold McDougall, director of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP, gave a clear form of this charge at the 1998 hearings on Federal Measures of Race and Ethnic-

ity and the Implications for the 2000 Census, held by the subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology. McDougall concentrated his objection on the effects that the introduction of a "multiracial" category may have on the census and the deleterious effects that would follow for the national civil rights agenda. According to McDougall's testimony, "Census data aggregated in its present form, respecting historically protected categories, has been used:

- to enforce requirements of the Voting Rights Act;
- to review State redistricting plans;
- to collect and present population and population characteristics data, labor force data, education data, and vital and health statistics;
- to monitor discrimination in the private sector and to establish, evaluate programs;
- to monitor and enforce the Fair Housing Act; and
- to monitor environmental degradation in communities of color."⁴⁰

This work is not done, as McDougall forcefully demonstrated, and non-convoluted census data is integral to this effort. McDougall's list is but a summary of the important work done with race statistics the census gathers. Representative Stephen Horn's (R-CA) opening statement at that hearing lists some thirty-four programs, stretching from the Education department to the Justice department.⁴¹ The laws involved include the most important civil rights legislation in the history of this country. These programs are extremely important for insuring, maintaining, and extending civil rights to many Americans—they should not be toyed with for the mere self-indulgence of the multiracial identity.

It is important to note that the main *de facto* leadership of the multiracial movement voiced strong support for the history and pursuit of civil rights for all persons of color. Indeed, McDougall worked with AMEA, Project Race, and Hapa to lend support to the "check-all-that-apply" option over the unified "multiracial" box option. The testimony of the leadership from the AMEA, Project Race, and Hapa categorically denounced the idea that their movement strives for anything like the color-caste systems in South Africa or Brazil.⁴²

THREAT AND RECOGNITION

Traditional non-white communities did not lose a significant amount of their populations because of the decision by the Census Bureau to collect multiracial data, nor has this data convoluted the collection of data of the traditional races in the United States. What has occurred is that we now know that a significant number of Americans consider themselves multi- or bi-racial persons.⁴³ The recognition of multiracial persons in the na-

tional census extends a challenge to various institutions across all governmental levels: shall local institutions, if they collect racial data, additionally count multiracial persons?

The reasons proposed to arrest the spread of the counting of multiracial persons parallel the general objections against the inclusion of a "multiracial" category in the national census. Local, institutional arguments against the spread of counting multiracial persons are tied to local concerns, however, in addition to being vulnerable to the rebuttals discussed above, these arguments suffer from serious practical problems that are created by the urge to altogether evade the issue of multiracial presence.

Ward Connerly's failed attempt to have a multiracial category added to the University of California's admission forms pointedly illustrates the dynamics around local worries about multiracialism. Regent Ward Connerly, during the fall of 2004, proposed to the UC regents that the university add a "multiracial" and "multiethnic" category to its admissions forms. He argued that this category was needed to recognize both the identity of multiracial students and demographic changes in society that are reflected in the student population.⁴⁴ Fresh on the heels of Connerly's failed Proposition 52, this move was motivated by his color-blindness-multiracial consciousness agenda.

Significantly, in opposition to Connerly's proposal, the American MultiEthnic Association, Hapa Issues Forum, and the Mavin Foundation released a joint declaration against Connerly's proposal. They supported the University of California's decade-long policy of allowing students to check "one or more" racial or ethnic category on admissions forms.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, the opposition of these groups to Connerly's color-blindness-multiracial consciousness agenda was not covered or given emphasis in the press coverage of the event. The opposition of those national groups to Connerly's proposal belies the oppositions that are too frequently drawn between multiracialism and the traditional civil rights agenda. Multiracialism, as imagined by the most visible and representative activist organizations, is not a threat to backward-looking race-conscious law and social policy.

Despite their opposition to Connerly's suspicious proposal, multiracial advocacy groups do want the number of multiracial individuals counted. They agree with Connerly on that single issue; their support, however, for being counted does not imply that they want their numbers removed from the counts of the traditional racial and ethnic groups, which is precisely the result that Connerly intended. The University of California allows students to "check one or more" racial and ethnic boxes on their admission forms, but it does not count the number of students who check more than one box. Opposition to such a count is based in the same fears and recriminations that have already been covered. The ends of race-conscious reparative or rectificatory policies do not justify the

refusal to count multiracial students, especially if such a count does not put the numbers for underrepresented minorities at risk. Refusal to count is tantamount to a refusal to recognize, and that failure of recognition is both morally and politically unjustified, and it is ineffective.

The refusal to count multiracial persons is simply absurd. If the worry is the loss of populations from traditional racial and ethnic groups, not counting multiracial persons will not stop the loss. Those who want to flee the traditional categories are not stopped, in this age of self-reporting, by denying access to a multiracial option on the national census or on admission forms: if they want to leave they can either resist the checking one box or they can take the radical option of passing.

Second, refusing to count multiracial persons does not stop the critics of race-conscious policies from using multiracialism as a divisive tool. Such critics as Connerly will not cease to say that, for example, affirmative action in higher education is unjustified because those whom we identify as “black” or “Asian” or “Latino” are not simply black or Asian or Latino. Counting multiracial persons exposes what the enemies of civil rights always knew: that there is a high-degree of mixing between the socially-labeled races, and that the children that have resulted are very aware of how they arrived in the world. The enemies of civil rights, at one point, hated that fact, now they seek to use it by claiming that few Americans are truly eligible for race-conscious programs. Indeed, Connerly and other opponents of race-conscious programs accuse the “civil-rights industry” of hiding the truth it fears. Not counting multiracial persons will not stop those critics, and simply amounts to a cheap and transparent cover-up. Such tactics are poisonous; they alienate multiracial individuals—a situation that completely contradicts the desire to hold multiracial persons within traditional groups—and they reek of moral and political weakness.

Further, the self-declaration of multiracial identity does not bear on the central questions at the heart race-conscious rectificatory or reparative justice. Do the generations who have suffered because of racial discrimination deserve remediation, rectification, or reparation for the crimes of racism? To what extent are the children of interracial unions qualified for these programs? It is on these grounds that the opponents of color-blind law and social policy should meet its proponents. The self-declaration of multiracial identity does not affect the essence of these questions. A mass movement of individuals asserting their multiracial identity is not necessary for multiracial genealogy to cause trouble for race-conscious laws and social policies.

Not counting multiracial persons is to act like the little Dutch boy with his thumb in the dike: we pretend to protect the status quo from unwelcome demographic changes that will fundamentally transform the life of race—with its benefits and flaws—in America. Attempts to stymie the recognition, and even the self-identification of multiracial persons, are

politically, morally, and practically flawed. The instinct to stymie this movement is rooted in the perception that multiracialism challenges race-conscious law and policy. As long as multiracial organizations act responsibly, multiracialism in itself should not threaten backward-looking arguments for race-conscious laws and policies.

Nonetheless, multiracialism does threaten popular conceptions of the ends of forward-looking race-conscious laws and policies. Forward-looking policies are concerned with nurturing social and institutional conditions that support some level of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity—a condition that is desirable for its beneficial effects on institutional ends and culture. It is significant for this conversation that the only grounds that affirmative action is justifiable, according to the Supreme Court’s decision in *Grutter v. Bollinger*, are forward-looking ones. Insofar as conceptions of forward-looking race-conscious policies and laws are predicated on received, albeit contentious, visions of racial and ethnic integration paired with cultural pluralism (or perhaps even nationalism), as opposed to assimilation or amalgamation, then multiracialism is a threat to the ends of those conceptions. Multiracial does not make diversity impossible, but it does challenge preconceived notions of diversity.

Forward-looking arguments for diversity seem to assume that diversity is accomplished by having some portion of each traditional group represented in institutions. It stresses what has been called external diversity, which its critics lampoon as oddly zoological, or worse as Epcot-center-style representations of diversity.⁴⁶ Multiracialism undermines the simplistic idea that an individual is identified and represents one racial group. The multiracial movement stresses the micro-diversity that exists within families and communities, or what can be called internal diversity.

Multiracial activism, as seen on the campuses of the University of California and the California State Universities, should continue to support the ends of backward-looking race-conscious policies. Likewise, they should, in principle, support the larger ends of forward-looking programs without backing down and acquiescing to indifference. Universities and other institutions should allow the populations they serve to “check more than one box.” They should also count those who have checked more than one box; they should provide statistics on multiracial students, staff, and faculty (likewise the Department of Education should follow suit).

The reasons for counting the multiracial populations begin with empirical concerns, but are founded in moral and political demands for recognition.⁴⁷ Multiracial organizations should demand recognition, and with that recognition they should forcefully push their respective visions of racial justice and harmony, in the knowledge that when such groups look forward to the future they will necessarily trouble American preconceptions of what racial justice looks like.

REPAIR

Multiracial persons find themselves born into a world riven by racial fault lines, a situation they frequently feel they carry within their bodies and identities. In reaction to racially broken societies, some have indulged in the romantic idea that multiracialism, amalgamationism, mestizaje, or some other conceptualization of ethnic or racial hybridity, is the conceptual key, or worldview that can repair racial faultlines. The idea is simplistic and messianic, and helps itself to the fallacy that a new unity equates harmony. Likewise, this argument has been forwarded in favor of multiracial or mestizo consciousness, seemingly a way of knowing and interacting with the world that does not other and that either accepts or synthesizes differences. In the extreme, this power has been identified with multiracials themselves as some messianic "cosmic race" that will sweep away the old divisions through their very existence. These romantic notions have been roundly criticized, in part by merely pointing out that mestizo nations have hardly achieved their touted values of racial democracy.⁴⁸

Yet multiracials can be said, without making them into a brown army of interracial messiahs, of having a particular role in interracial repair. All the same, we should be extremely reluctant to claim that multiracial identity is an identity called to repair. "Calling" specific categories of people to noble missions is too rhetorical. "Calling" multiracial individuals and groups to repair is not as satisfying as simply compelling them to attend the demands of social justice. Of course, one way to compel multiracial persons to attend to these matters is to not allow them to "escape" the traditional categories; thus forcing them to work against the forces of racism and oppression that afflict the traditional categories. That strategy, though, as has been argued above, is equally ineffective as "calling" them to anti-racist struggle.

Psychologists and sociologists friendly to the claims of the multiracial movement have rejected conceptions of multiracial identity as pathological or "broken" identities; they are, of course, breaking with the long-tradition of seeing multiracial persons as "mixed-up," as "marginal" or "tragic."⁴⁹ Asserting that multiracials are thrust in social conditions that require interracial and interethnic repair is not a return to those images of pathology. However, we need not entirely break with that tradition. Multiracial identity is a painful and difficult identity, and its richness as an experience is linked to its traditional problems and struggles.⁵⁰

All the same, it is preposterous to say to multiracial persons, "you are called to repair relationships that you did not break." It is tantamount to burdening children born out of wedlock with being bastards, and then asserting that they are responsible for rebuilding their legitimacy. Nonetheless, multiracialism is burdened with its special measure of responsibility to repair the ruptures around race in their lives, families, and

communities. Multiracial individuals are thrust into brokenness, into the ruptures that marks their condition. They can react like libertarians and assert their absolute autonomy and disconnection, or they can acknowledge the broken world that surrounds them. In the record of multiracial activism, there is evidence of both kinds of reactions; indeed, the former reaction is modeled by the actions of *Interrace* and Project Race, and the latter we find modeled in the actions of the University of California multiracial activists.

Turning to the idea of repair as an organizing principle for multiracial identity helps to transform the discussion of multiracialism from individualist to communal, political, and social. Repair is about self among others. The work of repair—moral, political, social, and psychological repair—will refer to the social and institutional concerns that haunt the assertion of multiracial identity. Given that traditional civil rights organizations stress the continuing need for distributive justice, and rectification and reparation for past racial harms, dialogues with those groups about social justice will be driven by those traditional concerns.

Further, beyond redistribution, rectification, and reparation, the work of repair is restorative.⁵¹ Restorative justice is a form of justice that has received too little attention from traditional legal, moral, and political theorists. The truth and reconciliation committees that have occurred in South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, and now in Rwanda and Burundi, are examples of attempts at restorative justice; those proceedings precede or work in concert with criminal and distributive justice. Restorative public discussions of race in the United States tend to be more *ad hoc* and are intermingled with criminal or civil proceedings (e.g., the prosecution in 2005 of Edgar Ray Killen, who was accused of murdering three civil-rights workers in Mississippi in 1964). In future restorative conversations, multiracialism should play a central role—it marks the boundaries of what needs restoration (e.g., retelling the central myths about the birth of our nation).

Understanding multiracialism identity as "called" to repair, and being born into conditions that demand repair, will confront the nation with the need to have discourses of restoration, rather than merely discourses of distribution and separation. Discourses of restoration are disturbing, and have the potential to go all the way to the bone of our racial history. One of the interesting aspects of restorative justice is that restorative dialogues do not, and cannot, have as an end to restore people to their pre-trauma conditions. Restorative justice seeks to heal and to bring victims to a new image, a post-traumatic image of themselves.⁵² Likewise, multiracialism as repair will not bring the nation or groups back to their pre-rupture condition. Multiracial persons should not have to heal themselves into oblivion. Rather, through a reflection of our racial history, mediated through our collective experience of love during times of racism, and

racism during times of love, we are led to an image of restoration and image of ourselves that we have not yet imagined.

Turning to repair as an organizing principle for multiracial identity, experience, and organization also aids to concretize the political and moral burdens that multiracialism needs to commit to if it is to resist the traps of racial privilege. In "Being and Being Mixed-Race" I argued that multiracial groups and individuals must fulfill specific conditions if it is not going to be politically and morally irresponsible:

- A rejection of naïve popular conceptions of race and biological conceptions of race.
- An understanding of race as a social category made real by social forces.
- An understanding that race, via racism, is a mode of oppression: Social status, privileges, and burdens are parsed out according to a racial hierarchy that places whiteness at the top and darkness at the bottom.
- A rejection of, and a commitment to resist, racial hierarchy and white privilege.⁵³

Those are fine conditions, but they do not place specific obligations on multiracial persons and organizations. They can be said to apply to all persons, multiracial or not. Specific or special obligations to commit to anti-racist principles and actions for multiracials are called for because of their experience and their place in the racialization process.

Multiracial persons and organizations are uniquely situated to cause or perpetuate racist harm, as their behavior is linked to the well-being of those who are vulnerable to racism. Multiracial individuals, through their interactions with the forces for racialization and the network of existent racial projects, have a direct effect on monoracial lives.

This call to repair and restoration is not foreign to the multiracial experience. Again, the identity is one born into brokenness, and assertions of multiracial identity have consistently evoked themes of personal, familial, and social repair.⁵⁴ In particular, multiracial identity has been justified on the grounds of familial repair, that we need to recognize all the members of interracial families.

Specifically, appeals to recognize "white mothers" has become a contentious point in so much of the discussion. It has been taken as evidence of the motivating desire to "escape blackness." Much credence should not be given to those who make such claims. There are nasty gender and race politics in those arguments, and they are largely *ad hominem* attacks. The push for multiracial identity, according to a few critics, is driven by the interests of white mothers of non-white children; those interests, accordingly, demonstrates the multiracial movement's relationship to white privilege. Such objections are superficial and ignore the thick rela-

tionships of family belonging that are nurtured rather than rejected in the post-civil rights era.

Nonetheless, we can turn to the claims of family belonging to ground a responsible and reparative multiracial politics. The demand to recognize, if you will, our mothers is a moral response, itself grounded in our obligations to care for those who are connected to us by bonds of love. This response, as has been elucidated by the proponents of the ethics of care, is political. In that light, multiracialism is caught, like Antigone, between the demands of political communities and communities of familial love.

The way out of this trap is to affirm the obligations that multiracial persons have to the memories of their mothers. To refuse that obligation, again, is a repetition of the ruptures of interracial intimacy that marks the history of race and multiracialism. Nonetheless, the experience, internal structure, and history of multiracialism implicitly demand that it confront the dynamics of racial privilege. This demand is the result in our movement toward our mothers. Our obligation to our mothers is a call to moral interconnection, and not an invitation to *laissez-faire*, disconnected politics.

An individualistic libertarian conception of absolutely autonomous identity is the reaction that I often receive from students when I confront them with the racist dynamics of multiracialism: "This is my identity, I am not causing direct harm to monoracial groups, and I have a right to truthfully identify myself." Individualism, though, fails to meet our moral demands to our mothers, and our familial obligations. If obligation to the memory of mothers is going to be the ground for multiracial identity, then other obligations follow.

The other obligations are illustrated by the comic, sometime cynical, Cuban and Puerto Rican saying about family racial identity and the hidden grandmother: "Those who aren't descended from the peoples of the Congo are descended from the Carabali; and for he who claims he knows no such thing, where are you hiding your grandmother?"⁵⁵ That is exactly the question I would put to multiracial individuals, as anyone else, who claims a radically individualistic conception of their social identities: Where is your grandmother? What of your obligation to the memory of your mother's mother?

The assertion of obligation to the memory of our mothers links us to obligations to the memories of our African American, Asian, Latina, Native American, and Anglo grandmothers—to their welfare of them and their children. This is a special obligation that multiracial children must face that is grounded in their experience and family ties. The demand for the recognition of multiracial identity, then, ought to be grounded in recognition of their particular responsibilities (psychological, social, economic, and political) to their mothers and their grandmothers.

The “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to multiracialism is related to the general evasion of discussions of interracial intimacy in public discourses of racial justice. Public discussions of racial justice have been restricted to public affairs for practical purposes, so as to not enflame opponents of racial equality or to run counter to the endogamous or nationalist values of some parts of the civil rights coalition. One result of this relegation is the shock that has greeted assertions of multiracial identity. Yet, multiracialism is just a part, a highly visible part, of interracial intimacy—the very topic that was ignored and dismissed in the first place.

The continued ignoring of interracial intimacy in the time of the browning of America comes from a stubborn desire to continue with resistance as usual and the fear that the baseline of racial justice has been shifted without traditional claims ever being met—this is the demands of justice part of the black-white binary that was discussed in chapter three. Yet, it is a dangerous strategy, because its continuance will make present claims based on the legacy and categories of the civil rights movement seem irrelevant to the lives of a changing American public.

In this context of silence about interracial intimacy, multiracialism represents a breakout of dissentious discourse, not only against racial categories, but also against the refusal to think about racial progress and justice within the private sphere. Multiracialism, then, is a gateway to the other submerged controversies around interracial intimacy that ethical and political theory has likewise ignored. This is especially true for individuals, who are just as likely not to be multiracial, who engage multiracialism as a starting point for thinking about the myths, secrets, and lies of their racial family identity. So much of the interest about multiracialism, especially from the young, is about their relationships with the interracial dynamics of the modern American family that contains members that have different racial identities: half-siblings, whether recognized by the family or not, adopted siblings, stepparents, and extended family.

The injustices of the American history of race are deeply related to conflicts over interracial intimacy. The way we have loved and failed to love across the color-line needs to be a part of any reasonable vision of racial reconciliation. “Don’t ask, don’t tell” policies about multiracial is yet another sad attempt to keep discussions of racial justice in the public sphere, away from the private, and away from the potentially troubling topic of interracial intimacy. However, discussions of racial justice, progress, harmony and so on cannot be so restricted. It is precisely the racial ruptures in our private lives that must be addressed if we are to achieve societal meaningful racial justice in the public sphere, and thus societal repair.

Challenging monoracial family identity and, more to the point, the reproduction of racial identities and divisions that attends the monoracial family is not enough. All hope does not lie in new happy, healthy multiracial families. They are not our political salvation. Integrated families

may come without substantial distributive justice or serious anti-racist policies effected. Nonetheless, the revolution of the American family, and the dismantling of racist and nationalist concepts of family belonging is an important condition of social justice. Revolutionizing, moreover, the American family will transform us in ways that will lead us to an image of ourselves that we may not welcome or recognize, but we cannot be so arrogant as to presume the face of justice before us.

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POSTSCRIPT (2015)

Chasing Mixed-Race Ghosts

My mixed-race story began abroad, at my birth in the city of Olongapo near the Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines in 1969. The base and the economies created around it brought sailors and marines, who were looking for entertainment, sex, and love together with locals looking for

economic opportunities. This had been the case since its founding by the Spanish Empire in 1884, then as a United States base that played a role in America's battles in the Pacific during World War II and the Vietnam War (I was born during the latter war), through its closure in 1992. The base was at the same time infamous as a mark of the Philippines' colonial domination by the United States, for its environmental damages, for the sex trade that operated around it, and the Amerasian children (many of whom were abandoned by their American fathers) created through the social connections the base made possible. I was one of those kids, and, despite being an American by birth, had to be naturalized as a citizen. Fortunately, I was taken to the other side, the American side, of the base's fence and then on to an early life of middle-class opportunities and problems. My fortune was entirely dependent on the considerable efforts of my mother and her marriage to an American who subsequently became my stepfather.

I have written about this before, in "Falling into the Olongapo,"⁵⁶ but I mention it here because I, at middle-age and mid-career, no longer feel the need to assume an objective academic stance on the topic and feel free to admit that my interest in the topic was initially motivated by my personal history, and, as a philosopher of race who has benefited from feminist defenses of embodied knowledge, I realized that a seemingly objective stance toward the topic of mixed-race identity limited as much as it aided my analysis. My personal investment in mixed-race involved the usual American confusions about racial identity (i.e., Am I Asian-American, black, white, other, or nothing at all?). But it also was just as much about chasing after the ghost of an absent biological father that I believed, particularly in my adolescence, would solve the enigma of my identity and belonging. This pained and personal story is also a global one, caught up in war, colonialism, immigration, and was multi-lingual and multi-ethnic from the start. Narratives of interracial and trans-national belonging, for that reason, have appealed to me for their ability to shed light on my experience by placing it within a global historical context. Lines such as, "Am I to be cursed forever with becoming somebody else on the way to myself?" from Audre Lorde's "Change of Season" have seemed crammed with meaning. My mother was a *mestiza* Filipina, my ghost father's ancestry was its own mixed-up white-black-and-whatever American story, and my white stepfather was largely Swedish-American. This story parallels the story of who knows how many others in the United States; mixed race has always been and remains a story of global movement and contact, and the study of mixed race identity and experience benefits from the expansion into what is now called global mixed-race studies.

Mixed race, with its global permutations, and in the age of the browning of America, troubles nationalized discussions of race that are overdetermined by census race-talk and its narrow categories (even with its

relatively new multiracial option).⁵⁷ It pushes discussions of American mixed-raced identities beyond the usual concerns around black-white racial identity and Native American ancestry. It adds complexity to debates about the meaning of race or its ontological status insofar as these debates are concerned with ordinary, everyday, or folk race-talk or concepts. What counts as ordinary race-talk when everyday people are increasingly tied to places, peoples, and practices whose race-talk does not match or is even inconsistent with American racial categories or practices?⁵⁸ Mixed-race identities contain legions and are collectively a specter that hangs over attempts to pin down any one meaning of race.

Humans were on the move and blending with each other long before the idea of race was invented. For most of the existence of our species, other gathering concepts that demarcated kinds of people were prominent. Race, however, is a distinctively modern concept that followed transigrations tied to modern global political developments including nationalism, the growth of global trade, and new ways of conceptualizing human biological, religious, and cultural variety. The effects of these developments on the lives of individuals in most nations have been singularly profound.

A couple of these effects, global dispersment and transformation, are illustrated by Christopher's Cozier's painting "castaway." The image is of a black male figure afloat in a green ocean speckled with blue and above him is a sky of white, black, and blue. Impaled on his back is a mast with a rectangular sail that is also an antique map of Africa, and part of Europe and Asia, filled with the wind, and topped with a small triangular black pennant.⁵⁹ As Cozier states of the image, we are "submerged but also mobile," traveling through layers of history, memory, culture, and geography through Africa, Europe, Asian, the Caribbean, and the Americas. On the move, we are also half-drowned, but alive. The phantom-like figure evokes Marx and Engels's diagnosis of modernity in the *Communist Manifesto* that "all that is solid melts into air."⁶⁰ Yet, not all of those who have been moved through history have been melted away by the forces of progress, as in the telling of Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay *Fate*,

We know in history what weight belongs to race. We see the English, French, and Germans planting themselves on every shore and market of America and Australia, and monopolizing the commerce of these countries. We like the nervous and victorious habit of our own branches of the family. We follow the step of the Jew, of the Indian, of the Negro . . . see the shades of the picture. The German and Irish millions, like the Negro, have a great deal of guano in their destiny. They are ferried over the Atlantic, and carted over America, to ditch and to drudge, to make corn cheap, and then to lie down prematurely to make a spot of green grass on the prairie.⁶¹

In the shadow of Emerson's cruel (and false) prediction, and within an essay celebrating the exceptional individual who resists fate, I can't help but compare Cozier's castaway to Walter Benjamin's angel of history, who while being blown forward by the storm called progress, glances backward and mourns the damage in his wake.⁶² Yes, the castaway moves forward, but the women and men he stands in for not only glance backward, they are marked, impaled with history. And, in contrast to Emerson's condemnation of the castoff as compost, they survive through *mestasaje*, *méstissage*, *creolization*, and *grit*.

As modern, albeit contradictory, confusing, and downright messy identities, mixed-race identities were born out of the modern impulse to categorize and control. Nothing is more indicative of this practice than the Spanish New-World practice of inventing special terms for different types of people, or *castas*, that resulted from the combinations of the groups they recognized: Spanish, Crillo, Mestizo, Castizo, Mulatto, Morisco, Albino, Coyote, Lobo, Zambo.⁶³ The resulting eighteenth-century paintings that documented this practice are remarkable and presage the American "black, mulatto, octoroon, and quadroon," and the South African "white, black, coloreds, and Asian" that were about social categorization, monitoring, control, and domination. This is a fundamental part of the history of mixed-race identity, and it has led some critics to rightfully see mixed-race identities as redolent of this racist past and as tools of racial division and domination (e.g., in the concern that the proposed adoption of a mixed-race category or option on the U.S. census was part of a conservative political project to roll back and undermine civil rights policies). Some also felt that such identities were false or illusory (if races are not real then mixed-race identities are doubly silly), redundant (American non-white racial categories are *ipso facto* mixed), or asserted in bad faith (mixed race identities are dependent, continue, and support anti-black, anti-indigenous, or even simply anti-*dark*, racist ideas, beliefs, and attitudes). What is wrong, the critics asked, with simply being black? Mixed-race seemed dishonest, a modern version of the practice of passing, and as such retrograde and dangerous, especially in the American context, with its focus on the black-white binary.⁶⁴

The problem was that, in the post-1960s world, not clearly belonging to, or being identified with, any race or ethnic group became itself a social problem, a loss in social status. In the shadow of the civil rights movement and its legal advances, with the resulting opening up of opportunities, integration, and intermarriage, the rise of muscular-assertions of ethnic and racial pride, and the end of racist immigration quotas in 1964, many individuals and groups wanted and needed their version of *Black Is Beautiful* and the politicized pride that came with it. Being between—neither this nor that—would not do for personal, social, and political reasons, and of course there was money to be made from this new target audience and from using their adaptable and broadly appealing images.

This new, intentionally self-aware and disorganized group, formed from patches of other recognized groups, rightfully sought tolerance, recognition, and affirmation. Plus, many in this movement put little stock in the one-drop rule, the black-white binary, or America's basic racial categories. Mixed-race individuals saw themselves as multiracial and multiethnic; they were variations of Asian Americans (black-Asian, Asian-white, or Asian-Latino), or Latino/Hispanic, which is a radicalized ethnic category that already included the other groups, and per the *castas* example, had its own long history that stretched back beyond 1492. And, to boot, these new self-avowedly mixed-race individuals and groups did not like being thought of as "mixed-up," tragic, or attached necessarily to bad biological concepts of race; so much so that some groups, such as UC Berkeley's "Mixed" student organization dropped references to race, or chose an alternative label, such as "Hapa." The relatively recent collection of photographs by Kip Fullbeck of mixed-race individuals that pairs black and white portraits of individuals (focusing on the face, and bare neck and shoulders) with short, handwritten testimonials about who they were stands as a prime example of the expressive-individualistic turn of the mixed-race movement.⁶⁵

My approach to these and related concerns was laid out in the articles "Being and Being Mixed-Race," "Mixed-Race Looks," "Fevered Desires and Interracial Intimacies," in *Jungle Fever*, and in the chapters "Interracial Intimacies" and "Responsible Mixed-Race Politics" from my book, *The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice*, which is collected in this volume.⁶⁶ I sought to defend the idea that "mixed race" was a real identity, or one with social presence and effect, that was, in the usual academic lingo, socially constructed. This was largely consistent with K. Anthony Appiah's argument that racial labels are social ascriptions, "identifications," rather than "identities" with some stable material essence or clear linguistic referent. I also defended the mixed race identity and its movement against the ethical and political objections above. I stand by those defenses, although I want to clarify that my critical analysis of mixed race identities was always more concerned about the social role, value, and meaning of mixed race than its ontological status.

What I would add to that analysis now, is to stress how mixed-race identification relates to what Appiah calls the ethics of identity.⁶⁷ Self-ascriptions of mixed race are in part reactions to changing social conditions; those changes opened up opportunities for new forms of identity. Individuals and families expressed their individuality in the usual late-twentieth-century form of claiming a label, taking pride in that label, and then seeking social and legal recognition. Mixed race is one of many modern badges of honor. The label is an iteration of expressive individuality, and sometimes of possessive individuality. When thinking about mixed race, I cannot help but think about first-person assertions that individuals have the right, in proper Lockean or in libertarian form, to

name themselves, to claim their identities; how else should we think of Maria P. P. Root's "Bill of Rights for Mixed Race Peoples"?⁶⁸ These assertions should be understood as modern liberal claims of personal autonomy and authenticity, which taps into the emergence of expressive individualism of 1960s counter-cultural movements, but turns on its head that era's rhetoric of group-based autonomy and authenticity. Mixed race is indicative of modern expressive individualism; it is another version of Walt Whitman's "I am large, I contain multitudes" but now in the context of the twenty-first century and the browning of America.

This analysis is not meant to put a special onus on mixed-race identity or to accuse it of a special sort of commodification; recall Marx and Engels's categorical claim that "all that is solid melts into air." All modern identities (nearly all "identifications") are caught in the same thrilling yet destructive grip of modernity. My earlier analyses did not benefit from fairly recent and excellent sociological and critical theoretical analyses of mixed-race identities, so they did not stress enough the larger transformative social and economic pressures that made identifying as mixed race or identifying with mixed-race others possible.⁶⁹ I did, however, argue for the possibility of reconciliation and understanding, and that accusations that mixed-race identities were disloyal, racist, or otherwise destructive of present cultural forms were largely misguided.

Behind this position was John Stuart Mill's conception of individuality, with its stress on the value of experiments in living, and Josiah Royce's view of loyalty as loyalty to loyalty rather than some predetermined or scripted object of commitment. Modern individuals in the face of plural values and plural societies develop their attachments and loyalties according to their broadly social and cultural backgrounds, but their commitments will also be shaped by their individuality and personal preferences.⁷⁰ In light of these influences, I called for mixed-race individuals and groups to embrace and defend their mixed-race identities as well as a responsible politic that eschewed racial privilege and accepted anti-racist principles.

This was an essentially liberal approach, but there are, however, other relevant nineteenth-century (and early twentieth-century) approaches to individuality, such as Friedrich Nietzsche's. This is a vision driven not by responsible experimentation attuned to not harming others, but by an individuality understood as exceptional, as a work of art, and drawing on destructive as well as creative passions. This is a conception of mixed-race that critics are right to impugn with negative intentions. Such expressions of mixed-race identity are not responsible; they regard personal identity the way a libertarian regards property: as possessed and rightfully transferable (or transformable), with little regard for the effects on third parties.

This sort of expression of mixed-race identity can all too easily play into the hands of the proponents of post-racialism. The rise of mixed-race

identity, along with the other demographic trends that account for the browning of America, are what is fueling the claim that we have entered a post-racial age, or the separate claim that post-racialism is an ideal situation where the bonds of racial identity and ascription have loosened. The quick response here is offered by an avalanche of sociological facts that the United States is not in a post-racial age, and careful skepticism about post-racialism as an ideal. My view on this is that post-racialism is unreasonably idealistic, and it offers a horribly regressive path that will not get us to the desired end. I say all of this as an addendum to where I left off in "Responsible Mixed-Race Politics." My recommendations remain the same—understanding but not succumbing to the feelings of disappointment and disloyalty that others have about mixed-race identity, responsible anti-racist politics, and acting in solidarity with dominated groups—but I no longer think that reconciliation with all the critics of mixed race is possible; their feelings of betrayal and loss cannot be dispersed by arguments alone. We should not be cursed while on the path to ourselves, yet the figure and the path of the castaway should haunt us.

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NOTES

1. "Responsible Mixed Race Politics" is reprinted by permission from *The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice* by Ronald R. Sundstrom, the State University of New York Press ©2008, State University of New York. All rights reserved.
2. I appreciate the semantic edge of "mixed-race" and "mixed-blood" for their confrontational qualities; however, I chose to use "multiracial" rather than "mixed-race" because the former distances itself from the erroneous idea that there are pure, or any, races to mix. Further, there is a growing consensus among multiracial organizations to favor the prefix "multi" because of the negative psychological connotations associated with "mixed," as in, "mixed-up," which parallel the stereotype of the tragic mulatto. "Multiracial" does not entirely escape the problems with "mixed race"; nonetheless it serves as useful shorthand for picking out individuals and groups who publicly represent their identity as being multiethnic or multiracial. All persons of modern nations are likely to have multiethnic or multiracial ancestry, but what makes "multiracials" special in the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries is their flouting of monoracial identity (sanctioned and imposed by the state and public opinion), and their public representations of themselves as multiracial persons. See my "Being and Being Mixed Race," *Social Theory and Practice* 27 (2001): 285–307.
3. Maria P. P. Root, ed., *The Multiracial Experience* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996).
4. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "'Multiracial' Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence," *University of Maryland Law Review* 57 (1998): 97–173; Christine B. Hickman, "The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census," *University of Michigan Law Review* 95 (March, 1997): 1161–1265; and Lisa K. Pomeroy, "Restructuring Statistical Policy Directive No.15: Controversy over Race Categorization and the 2000 Census," *University of Toledo Law Review* 32 (Fall, 2000): 67–87.
5. Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Being and Being Mixed Race," *Social Theory and Practice* 27 (2001): 285–307. In "Being and Being Mixed-Race," I argued that what I then called, mixed-race identity was real, and that it was best conceptualized through the experience of multiracial persons, a phenomenology of multiracial experience. Just as it is a real experience it is likewise one that is not necessarily a racist identity. Nonetheless, multiracialism may be expressed in a personally racist way, and it may be useful to racist social systems or institutions. I proposed, as a response to this challenge, that multiracial individuals have a particular obligation to systematically resist racism and reject white privilege. Unfortunately, my proposal did not place particular moral obligations on mixed-race individuals and the movement. Here I argue for specific obligations based on the ethics of memory.
6. Lewis R. Gordon, "Race, Biraciality, and Mixed Race—in Theory," in *Her Majesty's Other Children: Sketches of Racism from a Neocolonial Age* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997): 51–71; Rainer Spencer, "Assessing Multiracial Identity Theory

and Politics," *Ethnicities* 4:3 (2004): 357–79; and Jon Michael Spencer, *The New Colored People: The Mixed-Race Movement in America* (New York: New York University Press, 1997). Gordon's objections to mixed-race identity, in particular, are dripping with disdain, incredulity, and are as whole unhelpful and damaging.

7. When the check all that apply option was approved from the 2000 census, NAACP officials went on a tour of African American churches to discourage African Americans from checking more than the "black" box. For the NAACP, resisting the inclusion of a multiracial category, or the spread of multiracial identity, is a civil-rights issue, and their call on the institution of the black church highlights their position. This strategy, though, is morally questionable as it encourages the equation of multiracial identity with racist betrayal and social injustice, if not sin! Surely, that strategy increased the alienation of self-identifying multiracialism individuals and families in those congregations. That tour was hardly a movement of *agape*. See Frank Wu's discussion of multiracialism and the NAACP reaction in his *Yellow* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

8. Naomi Mezey, "Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and The National Imagination," *Northwestern University Law Review* 97 (Summer, 2003): 1701–68; and Lisa Tessman, "The Racial Politics of Mixed Race," *The Journal of Social Philosophy* 30:2 (Summer, 1999): 276–94.

9. See *supra* note 2.

10. See chapter 7 for further discussion of interracial sexuality.

11. Karren Baird-Olson, "Colonization, Cultural Imperialism, and the Social Construction of American Indian Mixed-Blood Identity," in *New Faces in a Changing America*, Loretta I. Winters and Herman L. DeBose, eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003): 194–221.

12. For a discussion of the historical recognition of multiracial genealogy and experience, see Werner Sollors's *Interracialism* (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2000).

13. See *supra* notes 3 and 5.

14. James F. Davis, *Who Is Black?* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991).

15. See *supra* note 3.

16. Randall Kennedy, *Interracial Intimacies* (New York: Pantheon, 2003).

17. The effects of counting multiracials in the national census, the recognition of multiracialism, and the failure of traditional Civil Rights policy to deal with the browning in America are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

18. Ronald Sundstrom, "Being and Being Mixed Race," *Social Theory and Practice* 27 (2001): 285–307; Kerry Ann Rockquemore and David L. Brunnsma, *Beyond Black* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002).

19. Werner Sollors, *Interracialism*.

20. See *supra* note 4.

21. See Randall Kennedy's discussion of the Jefferson-Hemmings affair in his *Interracial Intimacies*.

22. For such a careful review, see Kim M. Williams's "Multiracialism and The Future of Civil Rights Future," *Daedalus* 134:1 (Winter, 2005): 53–60.

23. For example, see Lisa Jones's *Bulletproof Diva* (New York: Doubleday, 1994).

24. Paul Spickard, "Does Multiraciality Lighten?: Me-Too Ethnicity and the Whiteness Trap," in *New Faces in a Changing America: Multiracial Identity in the 21st Century* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003): 289–300.

25. Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology, of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of Representatives, "Hearings on Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census," Serial No. 105–57, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998). See also, Michael Lind's *Next American Nation* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

26. *Ibid.*, 661.

27. Susan Graham is the executive director of Project Race. She has been accused of pursuing a multiracial agenda because, as a white mother, she is primarily interested

in passing down white privilege to her mixed-race black-white children. Graham has expressed support for Gingrich as well as some, but not all, of Ward Connerly's projects (she supported Proposition 54). She is in favor of anti-racist social policy, but refuses to support or reject affirmative action. For her positions on Gingrich and Connerly, or for that matter, Democrats and Republicans, see her letters posted on Project Race's website, www.projectrace.com. For typical exaggerated criticisms of Graham, see Spencer's "Assessing Multiracial Identity Theory and Politics."

28. See *supra* note 24, 662.

29. Ward Connerly, *Creating Equal. My Fight Against Race Preferences* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), and "A Homecoming, with Too Much Color," *Interracial Voice* (2001), www.webcom.com/~intvoice/connerly.html; and George F. Will, "Melding In America," *Washington Post*, (October 5, 1997): 7.

30. University of California Regents, Committee on Educational Policy, Office of the Secretary, "'Multiracial' Designation on the Undergraduate Admissions Application," RE-52, November 17, 2004.

31. See the website for the RPI, <http://www.racialprivacy.org>, for Connerly's statement to the UC Board of Regents. See, as well, the website for the American Civil Rights Institute, <http://www.acri.org/>, for more of Connerly's statements linking multiracialism and color-blindness. See also *supra* note 21.

32. See *supra* note 28.

33. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "'Multiracial' Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence," *University of Maryland Law Review* 57 (1998): 97–173.

34. Lawrence Blum, *I'm Not a Racist, But . . .* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

35. J. Angelo Corlett, *Race, Racism, and Reparations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). For a discussion of both Blum and Corlett's theory of racism, see chapter 7 of *The Browning of America*.

36. Tanya Kateri Hernandez, "'Multiracial' Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era of Color-Blind Jurisprudence," *University of Maryland Law Review* 57 (1998): 97–173; and Rainer Spencer, "Assessing Multiracial Identity Theory and Politics," *Ethnicities* 4:3 (2004): 357–79.

37. Carl N. Degler, *Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1971). See my discussion of the "mulatto escape hatch" in "Being and Being Mixed Race."

38. David Theo Goldberg, "Made in the USA," in *American Mixed Race*, ed. Naomi Zack (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995): 237–56, and *Racial State* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2001).

39. See *supra* note 23.

40. See *supra* 24, 582–83. See also, Lisa K. Pomeroy, "Restructuring Statistical Policy Directive No.15: Controversy over Race Categorization and the 2000 Census," *University of Toledo Law Review* 32 (Fall, 2000): 67–87.

41. See *supra* 24, 6–12

42. Still the public recognition of multiracialism could reinforce popular conceptions of the value of blackness in relation whiteness and so on. In other words, it could lend support to racial hierarchy. This potential is very much there and has been exploited by individuals and organizations, such as advertising agencies. See Kerry Ann Rockquemore and David L. Brunnsma, *Beyond Black* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002); and Caroline A. Streeter, "The Hazards of Visibility: Biracial Women, Media Images, and Narratives of Identity," in *New Faces in a Changing America*, Loretta I. Winters and Herman L. DeBose, eds. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003): 301–22.

43. G. Reginald Daniel, *More Than Black?* (Philadelphia: Temple, 2002).

44. University of California Regents, Committee on Educational Policy, Office of the Secretary, "'Multiracial' Designation on the Undergraduate Admissions Application," RE-52, November 17, 2004; and Tanya Shevitz, "Connerly Wants Multi-Race Box on University Admission Applications," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 15, 2004: B2, and "Multiracial Checkbox in Doubt," *San Francisco Chronicle*, November 18, 2004: B3.

45. American MultiEthnic Association, Hapa Issues Forum, and MAVIN Foundation, "Open Letter Requesting Support for Petition against Ward Connerly's 'Multiracial/Multiethnic' Category Proposal," October 26, 2004.

46. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004), and Walter Benn Michaels, *The Trouble With Diversity* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

47. Patrick F. Linehan, "Thinking Outside of the Box: The Multiracial Category and Its Implications for Race Identity Development," *Howard Law Journal* 44 (Fall, 2000): 43–72; Naomi Mezey, "Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and The National Imagination," *Northwestern University Law Review* 97 (Summer, 2003): 1701–68; and Lisa Tessman, "The Racial Politics of Mixed Race," *The Journal of Social Philosophy* 30:2 (Summer 1999): 276–94. Multiracialism fundamentally challenges the census, as well as forward-looking conceptions of racial justice. It forces us to think about the various racial and ethnic pressures on the American population, but it need not entail the end of all race counting. As was discussed in chapter 3, the challenge of multiracialism is consistent with attempts to radically rethink the census's race and ethnic categories. See, for example Kenneth Prewitt's "Racial Classification in America," *Daedalus* 134:1 (Winter, 2005): 5–17. I support Prewitt's recommendation that race and ethnic categories be combined and that respondents continue to be allowed to check more than one box.

48. I discussed the romance of multiracialism in chapter 4 of *The Browning of America*. For further discussion of this issue see my "Being and Being Mixed-Race," and Linda Martin Alcoff, "Mestizo Identity," *American Mixed Race*, ed. Naomi Zack (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995): 257–78. For a recent philosophical, political, and theological romance of multiracialism, see John Francis Burke, *Mestizo Democracy* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002). For a criticism of such multiracial messianism, see David Theo Goldberg, *Racial State* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2001).

49. See *supra* note 2.

50. Linda Martin Alcoff, "Mestizo Identity," *American Mixed Race*, ed. Naomi Zack (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1995): 257–78.

51. Elizabeth Spelman, *Repair* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002).

52. *Ibid.*

53. See *supra* note 4, 302.

54. See *supra* note 2.

55. Gregory Velasco y Trianosky, "Beyond Mestizaje: The Future of Race in America," in *New Faces in a Changing America: Multiracial Identity in the 21st Century* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003): 176–93.

56. Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Falling into the Olongapo River," *Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2: 2 (2003): 25–27.

57. For current demographic information on multiracial Americans, see the Pew Research Center's "Multiracial in America: Proud, Diverse and Growing in Numbers," Washington, D.C.: 1–153. Last Modified June 11, 2015, www.pewsocialtrends.org/2015/06/11/multiracial-in-america/.

58. This question and how it challenges methods in the philosophy of race is perceptively discussed by Paul C. Taylor in his "Context and Complaint: On Racial Disorientation," *Graduate Faculty Journal* 35: 1–2 (2014): 1–21.

59. This piece is a part of Christopher Cozier's series, *Tropical Nights*, which was started in 2006 but is ongoing. More about it can be found from his blog devoted to the work, <http://tropicalnight.blogspot.com/>. It is currently in the collection of the Brooklyn Museum, http://www.brooklynmuseum.org/exhibitions/infinite_island/highlight.php?a=EL51.41. The piece "castaway," can be seen on the artist's Flickr site, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/56271618@N00/483744370/in/set-72157600176542058>.

60. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, edited by Frederic L. Bender (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2013). I appreciate concerns about the translation of this phrase from the original German, "Alles ständische und ste-

hende verdampft," but I chose to use the present translation because it remains evocative of the velocity and effects of historical change.

61. Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fate," *Essays & Lectures*, edited by Joel Porte (New York: The Library of America, 1983): 950.

62. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," *Illuminations* (New York, Harcourt, Brace, and World, Inc., 1955).

63. Magali Marie Carrera, *Imagining Identity in New Spain: Race, Lineage, and the Colonial Body in Portraiture and Casta Paintings* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003). Samples of these paintings can be found online, http://www.nacion.com/ln_ee/ESPECIALES/raices/raices25.html.

64. The controversy over Rachel Dolezal that occurred in the summer of 2015 has some fascinating and troubling connections with the discussions over mixed-race identity and the history of passing. Commentators have focused on the fact that she was delusional, and have seemed to imply that what distinguishes her from biracial or mixed-race African Americans was that she could choose to no longer identify as black. The potential for her making that choice, however, is not unique to her case. Some multiracial individuals who identify with traditional racial groups could also cease to do so out of convenience. Indeed, Maria P. P. Root identifies this as a mixed-race "right"; see Maria P. P. Root, "A Bill of Rights for Racially Mixed People," in *The Multiracial Experience: Racial Borders as the New Frontier*, ed. Maria P. P. Root (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996): 3–14. See Allyson Hobbs's "Rachel Dolezal's Unintended Gift to America," *New York Times*, June 17, 2015, accessed on June 30, 2015, <http://nyti.ms/1MLBYiO>; and Anna Holmes's "America's 'Postracial Fantasy,'" *New York Times*, June 30, 2015, accessed on June 30, 2015, <http://nyti.ms/1GWCmtr>.

65. Kip Fulbeck, *Part Asian, 100% Hapa* (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2006).

66. My writings were guided by and reacted to the groundbreaking work in philosophy of mixed race by Naomi Zack and Linda Martin Alcoff, and in psychology by Maria P. P. Root. See Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Being and Being Mixed Race," *Social Theory and Practice* 27 (2001): 285–307; "Mixed-Looks," *Contemporary Aesthetics*, Special Volume 2, (2009), <http://www.contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=540>; "Fevered Desires and Interracial Intimacies in Jungle Fever," in *The Philosophy of Spike Lee*, ed. Mark T. Conrad (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011): 144–62; and *The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice* (Albany: SUNY, 2008).

67. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

68. Maria P. P. Root, "A Bill of Rights for Racially Mixed People," in *The Multiracial Experience: Racial Borders as the New Frontier*, ed. Maria P. P. Root (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1996): 3–14.

69. Kimberly McClain DaCosta, *Making Multiracials: State, Family, and Market in the Redrawing of the Color Line* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); and Michele Elam, *The Souls of Mixed Folk: Race, Politics, and Aesthetics in the New Millennium* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

70. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, vol. 18 of *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*, edited by John M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977). Josiah Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1909).