

SHELTERING XENOPHOBIA

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Abstract

What is xenophobia? Why is xenophobia immoral? How is xenophobia's conceptual and moral meaning diminished? Investigations of these questions would invigorate xenophobia as a topic in public morality and discourage the public's acquiescing to xenophobia's new prominence. This paper focuses on the third question, the diminishment of xenophobia. In the first section, I outline a general conception of xenophobia. In the second, I explain how theories of membership in liberal democratic societies relegate xenophobia to a minor moral concern. And, in the third, that the conflation of xenophobia with racism disadvantages the former. How liberal Democratic nations imagine membership (not surprisingly) and how those nations imagine racism (surprisingly) shelters xenophobia.

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Introduction

Xenophobia rises.¹ Never disappearing, it recedes from prominence, and makes regular unwelcome returns. Unlike the proverbial unwanted guest who merely stays too long, xenophobia terrifies the host with the possibility that it will never leave, and forever ruins the act of hosting, sheltering, and giving sanctuary. Close the doors, give no shelter, tear down the sanctuary: this is what the majority desires.²

The hospitable minority, for those whom hospitality is either a sacred or ethical obligation or both, is overwhelmed by the masses' noisy demands to shut the door. As if that were not enough, the inhospitable, using the same holy and constitutional texts, glory in denying sanctuary. They cry out in fear and worry that their country is being overrun, that it is under siege, and that denying hospitality to threatening foreigners is right and good. Foreigner hatred is justified and foreigner fear is embraced. Hence, the organization "Stop Islamisation of Europe" (SIOE) declares: "Racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense."³

SIOE's message is clear: racism is evil, Islamophobia is not racism, ergo Islamophobia is not evil. This fallacious syllogism I call xenophobia's double play: (1) xenophobia is compared to superficial templates of racism, and then (2) justified as nonracist. Racism is sidestepped, and xenophobia is eluded by its explicit absence. Muslims are condemned as a historic, monolithic, and invariable threat against every aspect of Western liberal democratic societies, and, thus, judged worthy of *phobia*. Indeed, Islamophobia is judged, in contrast with racism, to be reasonable and rational, and the label "Islamophobe" is embraced as a rallying cry. Yet xenophobia lingers in the structure of the term *Islam + phobia*. Muslims

simply and terrifyingly are the *xenos* in this instance. Moreover, and beyond this superficial syntactical similarity, the history of xenophobia lingers in this example. Just as other ethnic, racial, and religious groups have been demonized as a foreign, total threat, so do Muslims suffer this recent wave of fear and hatred. Do not be fooled by the submergence of the general term *xenos* in SIOE's prideful slogan, Islamophobia is a form of xenophobia. SIOE's blatant embrace of xenophobia, moreover, is more than bold rhetoric: it is an act that is made possible by the loss of meaning of the term *xenophobia*, and an accompanying diminishment of moral outrage over xenophobic beliefs, attitudes, and acts.

To counter xenophobia, many fronts against it should be opened up: it should be roundly denounced; social scientists should point out how peoples are pushed and pulled across borders by the global capitalism and world politics; ethicists and political theorists should debate the moral and political responsibilities that are generated toward immigrants and refugees by those international forces; religious organizations should, as acts of religious obedience and civil disobedience, provide sanctuary to immigrants and refugees; and civil associations should work to counter the strong currents of inhospitality that run through society.

To counter the dual loss—a loss of both meaning and moral judgment—around the idea of xenophobia that SIOE and its ilk take advantage of, the idea of xenophobia should be clarified and its moral status explained. That is the task in this piece, which focuses on the question, how is xenophobia's conceptual and moral meaning diminished—how is it sheltered? Investigations of such questions would invigorate xenophobia as a topic in public morality and discourage the public's acquiescence to xenophobia's new prominence. Related questions that should be investigated include, what is xenophobia and what is its relation to racism and nativism? What are xenophobia's social and political harms? Xenophobia's definition and relation to racism and nativism is briefly addressed in the following section, and my answer to the question of xenophobia's social and political harms is indicated throughout the paper, but a thorough answer to these questions is reserved for a separate treatment.⁴ In section 2 I explain how theories of membership in liberal democratic societies relegate xenophobia to a minor moral concern, and, in section three, that the conflation of xenophobia with racism disadvantages the former. I claim that how liberal democratic nations imagine membership (not surprisingly) and how those nations imagine racism (surprisingly) shelters xenophobia.

Xenophobia as Civic Ostracism

The core meaning of modern xenophobia is civic ostracism.⁵ Civic ostracism involves exclusion, but also, as the term *ostracism* denotes, civic banishment: those who are within the nation are regarded as not really belonging *here*, within the abstract, pure, or ideal nation.⁶ It is a subjective belief or affect, usually from the perspective of an individual who is, in their imagination, fully rooted in the nation, that some other person or group cannot be a part of that nation. These strangers cannot be authentic participants of the cultural, linguistic, or religious traditions of the nation they inhabit; they do not derive from soil of the nation's land or the blood of its people. The German word for such an outsider, *ausländer*, captures the social and political, as well as the geographic and natality, senses of being an outsider to the land and its people.

This division between the insider and outsider of the nation is illuminated by Jean-Paul Sartre's insight that a division between the "real" and "abstract" nation ran through French anti-Semitism.⁷ The division between those who "really" belong, and those whose associations are merely abstract demonstrates the ontological arrogation of xenophobia—it is a claim of separate fundamental, as well as social, being. On one hand there is the "real" nation that includes those with authentic claims bases on blood and land, and on the other, there is the "abstract" whose belonging is mediated through law and bureaucracy, and includes those whose links are not secured through blood or soil. The world of the anti-Semite, or the xenophobe, is divided, and in Fanon's formulation of the colonial world, it is divided into compartments, such that even, or especially in colonial zones, where colonial presence is implicitly violent, civic ostracism is enacted and enforced.⁸

This division is illustrative of civic ostracism, and is connected to the related ideas of "perpetual foreignness" or having a "probationary" belonging. The presence of some groups within a nation is considered so inconsistent with the idea of the nation that their foreignness seems perpetual, and if they are given an official status, then their belonging is probationary, and dependent upon their assimilation.⁹ The stigma of perpetual foreignness or being a probationary member of the nation is most often applied in the United States to Asian Americans, Latinos, and increasingly Muslims, and peoples from the Middle East, North Africa, or Southeast Asia, or in other words, people who are presumed Arab or Muslims. This syndrome in turn illustrates corporeal malediction.¹⁰ It is

a mismatch between one's first-person experience of the body and the historical and social meaning that is laden on it by one's condition, circumstances, and society. In the case of the perpetual foreigner, corporeal malediction involves important geographical, linguistic, and cultural elements: *they do not belong here*.

Xenophobia is a general idea and is strongly related to the sometimes preferred term, nativism. Nativism however is conceptually dependent on xenophobia and indicates a positive political project to actively exclude or expel those judged to be too foreign to belong, or to hoard the national community's resources and keep them from being exploited by foreigners. One can imagine, for example, groups within a nation, or even a nomadic group, that expresses xenophobic attitudes without making specific nativist claims. Whether, however, one uses "xenophobia" or "nativism" depends on the context of the situation and the social-political practice and interests of organizations or institutions being examined.

Just as xenophobia is distinct from nativism, it is also distinct from racism, and this distinction, even when it is poorly made, allows for xenophobia's double play and its moral diminishment. Although the history between racism and xenophobia is deeply intertwined, and instances of both are difficult to unravel from each other, there are examples of each that need not involve the other. For example, an instance of racism without xenophobia would involve some group, such as a national minority that clearly belongs in the nation but are treated as racial outsiders by other dominant groups. Xenophobia without racism would involve civic ostracism that targets some group within the nation for their presumed nationality regardless of race. The rhetorical force of the presumption that xenophobia can be separated from racism in arguments that are either anti-immigrant or for the limitation of immigration and refugee rights allows xenophobia to be sheltered. One strategy to counter this is to emphasize the links between xenophobia and racism. That makes historical and practical sense, but it has some shortcomings, which I discuss below. I argue that in addition to anti-racist politics that rebut such separation, that anti-xenophobic strategies be engaged.

Nationalism Shelters Xenophobia

Nations assume a sovereign right to determine individual membership in their nations. The rights of residency and citizenship are granted by

nations to whom they judge meet their constitutional criteria for either. This power is rooted in the idea of national self-determination—indeed it is the basis of the civic “self” that seeks political autonomy—and is thus considered fundamental to national sovereignty. In the United States, the right to determine membership is instantiated by the judicial branch’s granting of plenary power to regulate immigration law to the executive and legislative branches.¹¹

The sovereign right to determine membership is embedded in liberal political theory: it is present at the constitutive, original moment (both the mythical monumental historical and theoretical moments) of the social contract. This embedding is theoretical justification, but this political founding myth is not the source of plenary power. The source is in the assumption and assertion of national sovereignty over membership, and it is backed up (to the degree that it can be, by the enforcement of immigration, naturalization, and border security policy). Members of the social contract, through the act of constituting the body politic, get to determine membership, with its rights, duties, and obligations, in that body. A consequence of this political founding myth of self-constitution, is that social justice is defined as fair relations between members; it becomes an intra-national idea, and is used, in ideal political theory, to judge and regulate the effects of the basic structure of society on members, their life chances, and the distribution of the benefits and burdens of society between members.¹² Additionally, this act of self-constitution, with the power of inclusion and exclusion, is credited with the creation of communities of character and meaning: the emergence of a common form of worship, languages, manners and mores, narratives and monuments, and virtues and values.¹³

The sovereign right to determine membership alone creates many obstacles, some justified (a fair and reasonably terminable immigration process) and many not (the flouting of international laws and treaties governing migration), to would be refugees and immigrants who are seeking shelter, a livelihood, and a guarantee that their basic human rights will be honored.¹⁴ First, the dynamics of nationalism transforms whole territories—enormous areas of land and collections of faiths, cultures, and languages—into ours and not theirs. The nation state becomes concerned with inclusion and exclusion, with the creation and division of friends from enemies.¹⁵ Second, it delimits social justice as an intra-national idea. Third, immigrants, and those associated with immigrant communities,

including naturalized citizens or citizens ancestrally related to immigrant groups, are seen as a threat to national communities of character and meaning.

This narrative is so powerful it has determined modern Western conceptions of sanctuary and hospitality. Sanctuary and hospitality are no longer duties or obligations derived from religious authority, moral or political theory, or social and environmental conditions. No, instead they are now gifts and acts of charity. Nationalism, indeed, makes the modern concept of sanctuary, which is fundamentally incredible on a national scale, credible. This is not the sanctuary of Abraham's tent, or of a home, church or synagogue, or community: it is the presumption that a vast nation—despite the massive pulls and pushes of the world economy, and its self-interested geopolitical machinations—could have the audacity to offer or, more often, deny, with a straight face, sanctuary to “outsiders.”¹⁶ Additionally, in the years after 9-11, Americans' frustration with immigration from Mexico and Latin America combined with its fear of Arabs and Muslims to further transform the idea of sanctuary from a moral burden to a threat to national security. American cities that declared that they were “sanctuary cities” (local officials, such as the police, would not inquire about the residency or citizenship status of residents seeking municipal services) were accused of harboring criminals and potential terrorists. Sanctuary is depreciated as a threat to the rule of law.¹⁷

What I have identified as the second obstacle, the delimitation, or distortion, of social justice to an intra-national idea, has further negative effects. First, since the ordering of the basic structure of society did not determine the beginning nor the progress of the life of the refugee or immigrant, then (within the constraints of ideal political theory) their life chances are not a matter of social justice. What has happened to them may be a matter of international justice, but it is not the concern of social justice, and is not a concern of “ours.”

This reasoning is similar to the reasoning of so-called “lifeboat ethics,” the idea that each nation is like a lifeboat floating in the sea. Each lifeboat has a specific “carrying capacity”—it can hold only so many people—and taking in more than it can hold will sink the lifeboat and all its passengers. The moral of its story is that saving those in the water (or incautious sexual reproduction in the boat) endangers everyone else. The proponents of lifeboat ethics say to those who want to extend sanctuary, “fine, but you will have to make room for those you want to save by jumping overboard

yourself!” The unfortunates in the water are there presumably because they did not pay attention to the carrying capacity of their own lifeboats, or their lifeboats were poorly captained; all the same, we are not morally required to save them, because that would be akin to a moral obligation to kill oneself. Of course, in this incredibly simple story, the lifeboats float in one world, but do not have the complex global environmental, economic, political, and social interrelations and interdependencies of actual nations on Earth.¹⁸ Our actual cosmopolitan or global connections undermine the tenability of this thought experiment and reveal it to be either irrelevant to our real conditions or a device in the service of moral callousness.

The callousness of lifeboat ethics is the kind of moral disregard about noncitizens that the delimitation of social justice gives rise to. Although the marginalization of immigrants and refugees is mediated by constitutional law, and discouraged by the cosmopolitan inclinations of some liberal theories,¹⁹ nonetheless, the message to citizens is clear: their problems are not ours; as long as we did not push them into the sea, we do not have to save them—let them drown.

The peril of drowning in some cases is literal; migrants from North Africa and the Middle East attempt to boat into Spain and Malta, those from China and South Asia attempt the same into Australia, and Haitians into the United States. A few members of far-right parties want these boats sunk,²⁰ but most citizens want the migrants detained off shore without consideration of their suffering or legitimate claims for asylum. In the desert Southwest of the United States a similar story plays out, but, instead of drowning in water, migrants are in danger of dying from the lack of it as they attempt to cross the dangerous Sonoran Desert. In response, Americans have supported stronger border enforcement and crackdowns against undocumented Hispanic and Latino immigrants. Moreover, apart the issues of border enforcement and deportation of undocumented immigrants, Americans along the Arizona-Mexican border have even fiercely debated the morality and legality of leaving water out for the desert-crossers so they do not die of dehydration.²¹

The walls that shelter xenophobia within nations are made of callousness. A lack of regard for the dignity of immigrants leaves them vulnerable to economic and political exploitation and waves of xenophobic persecutions. The populace nurse xenophobic attitudes, certain politicians and demagogues gain political capital from whipping up fear and resentment toward perceived foreigners and immigrants, and some businesses (those that take advantage of

an underground economy of low-wage labor or are in the business of detaining undocumented immigrants) profit from the ensuing heated, divisive rhetoric—this was the process behind Arizona’s controversial immigration law, SB 1070, which mandates that all municipal agents, mainly municipal and state police, enforce federal immigration law by detaining undocumented immigrants.²²

Callousness about the fate, livelihood, or rights of immigrants goes beyond them to touch the lives of all that are perceived as foreigners. This includes naturalized citizens, citizens with one immigrant parent who nevertheless gain citizenship through *jus sanguinis* (the right of blood), and citizens who gain it through *jus soli* (the right of the soil). Especially vulnerable are the native-born minor children of an immigrant or refugee whose access to the rights of citizenship and the benefits of society—and who would rightfully and eventually take on the duties of adult citizenship—is imperiled by the immigration or refugee status of their parents. In the United States, conservatives, a group who typically regard the constitution as sacred and inalterable, seek to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment’s implicit recognition of *jus soli* and provision of birthright citizenship.

Blood and land, and, apparently, constitutional law, matter little when you look, sound, or act like a foreigner. Xenophobic attitudes doom those citizens, who are associated with foreignness, a group largely made up of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities, to being perpetual foreigners and civic outsiders. Therefore, in the United States, Mexican Americans are simply Mexicans, and Asian Americans are Asians. In Germany, Turkish Germans are Turks. The Roma, in France and Italy, no matter their residency status and despite European Union laws governing immigrations from member states, are treated as simply Gypsies and expelled. Throughout the Eastern European states and Middle East, Jewish citizens are simply Jews. Likewise, Muslim citizens in Europe and America are simply Muslims. They are not us; they are aliens, *ausländer*, perpetually foreign, and a foreign element, even an infection, in the body politic.

This puts in context the depth of the despair of German chancellor Angela Merkel’s comments in Potsdam to her party members:

We kidded ourselves awhile; we said, “They won’t stay, sometime they’ll be gone.” But this isn’t reality. And of course the approach to build a multicultural society—to happily live side by side with each other—this approach has failed, utterly failed.²³

“We” and the “they”—there they are. It is almost incredible that the “they” she is brazenly referring to includes citizens. The political leader of one of the major Western liberal democratic nations, and Germany no less, is talking about her citizens—and their civic belonging, their fundamental relation to the state as citizens—as if they were separable from the civic we.²⁴

Merkel’s comments demonstrate the awful power of the third obstacle created by the sovereign right to determine membership: immigrants and citizens who are regarded as perpetual foreigners are seen as a threat to national communities of character and meaning. Her comments additionally illustrate how nationalism can nurture xenophobia. It can encourage the development of both explicit prejudices and problematic implicit attitudes against “foreigners.” When the conditions are right, liberal democratic societies are hothouses for xenophobia, nurturing it from a sprout of an attitude to a blossom of nativism, a fully developed political ideology. Moreover, apart from deeply committed nativists, it can allow xenophobes to hide behind the claim that they do not wish foreigners ill; rather they merely do not want them here. Nationalism shelters xenophobia.²⁵

National Narratives of Racism Shelter Xenophobia

The attitudes of citizens toward noncitizens need not be negative, and indeed, Rawls thinks that just societies should broadcast a healthy respect toward the citizens of other nations as part of the comity of nations.²⁶ The line, however, between citizen and noncitizen, and the local emphasis on social justice, demotes concern with noncitizens in political and ethical questions. Ethical cosmopolitans decry this demotion, and when such denials of equal moral status appear to be based on race, ethnicity, or religion, then they are condemned as xenophobic, nativist, or racist. But xenophobia is a deep, endemic problem; pointing to the specter of xenophobia or racism as warning is not sufficient.²⁷

The relative weakness²⁸ of xenophobia as a term of moral suasion is a tool in the service of those already committed to apathy or to antipathy toward distant suffering others, and the charge of racism against noncitizens can be easily deflected. Once accusations of racism are evaded, charges of xenophobia offer little traction. This is how that double play works: Xenophobia is rhetorically distinguished from racism, and is therefore denied the analogical and metaphorical force that racism has in its various national contexts. Drawing on well-known national narratives

about racism, which in the United States is influenced by the black-white binary,²⁹ does not help since those portrayals, with their particular contexts (e.g., the U.S. Civil Rights Movement), also mark exploitable differences—this is the internal logic of the cynical strategy of employing a nonwhite partisan, who is also clearly and enthusiastically a citizen, to vouch for the nonracist credentials of the anti-foreigner organization (thus, the significance of the black hand in SIOE's logo). Such rejections of moral analogy between xenophobia and racism should not be brushed off as mere rhetoric. It is effective rhetoric that connects with other controversies over terms such as *illegal alien* or *illegal immigrant*.³⁰

This process is evident the example of the SIOE slogan discussed above. Their website displays an image of a white hand shaking a black one, with acronym and the phrase “against racism” framing the image. White and black: that is race is for SIOE and racism is the rejection of a group because of apparent color differences. Their complaint against Islam, in contrast, is based in their belief that Islam is violently incompatible with democracy, and that Muslims are engaged in a cultural takeover of European civilization. This allows room for the SIOE, and its variations across Europe and the United States, to make the claim that if they are not racist, then their xenophobia is a product of common sense—the desire to protect your life and way of life is rational, and fears about the theological-political-cultural threat of Islam are reasonable.

There are many responses to SIOE's depiction of race and racism—it exploits naïve biological views of race, it is cynical, and plainly self-serving—yet, it displays my basic point: xenophobia does not look like racism, as we have imagined it through our national narratives. SIOE uses nationalism and national conceptions of racism to shelter their xenophobia. This sheltering of xenophobia through the process of rhetorically separating xenophobia from racism is a straightforward example of how the black-white binary skews discussions of racism and may even aid in the moral diminution of xenophobia. The black-white binary, as I have defined it, is a complex set of at least six ideas about the dominant roles of white and black in the U.S. racial system, hierarchy, and history. The black-white binary is imagined to be a master key to all things racial. It is a key to open up a nation's racial history and problems, and is central to any potential solution to those problems. Although SIOE's distinguishing of xenophobia from racism is a transnational instance of the black-white binary in operation, it dovetails with the particular national narratives of racism where versions of the black-white binary have guided

popular conceptions of racism. The image that SIOE employed clearly participates in the second form of the black-white binary, which states that, “racial patterns can be empirically described solely using black and white terms.”³¹ Their naïve description of antiracism through the visual representation of clasped black and white hands, and the implied conception of racism as simply prejudice against skin color as a mark of visually evident racial difference, metaphorically monopolizes the meaning of racism.

Perhaps I have surrendered too easily to SIOE’s dichotomy. A critic could argue that instead of accepting a distinction between xenophobia and racism, one should reject the second premise of SIOE’s argument: “Islamophobia is not racism.” That may be a reasonable strategy. Early chapters of the history of racism involve similar attitudes and beliefs about both Muslims and Jews. During the years of the Spanish inquisition and the spread of anti-Semitism through Europe, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, Muslims and Jews were targeted by a deadly mix of beliefs: they practiced a faith opposed to the “true-faith” of Christianity, when they did convert they did so falsely, they were agents of the devil, they were carriers or even instigators of disease and ruin, the souls and character of these peoples were marked by God for punishment and subservience, they were incapable of being civilized, and so on: they were tainted by the mark of Ham.³² A similar process has occurred with particular instances of xenophobia, such as Islamophobia: it blends cultural prejudices against Muslims and Islamic, Arab, and Middle Eastern-associated cultures; it demonizes and reduces them to a cultural threat to the West or as potential terrorists; and through those processes it ends up racializing Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners, and those falsely associated with them, such as Sikhs.³³ This history is not to be denied but drawing on that history is not enough; the civic ostracism in the core of this xenophobia needs singling out. As blatantly self-serving as the SIOE slogan is, it displays how xenophobia-inspired civic ostracism is not based in race *per se*, and how xenophobia does not look like racism as it has been imagined through national narratives. National narratives of racism shelter xenophobia.

Conclusion

Nationalism shelters xenophobia and so do national narratives of racism. Together they operate to perform xenophobia’s double play, which has been

used to keep the moral status of xenophobia as wrong diminished. In those few cases where xenophobia is clearly identified as condemnable, usually after a world-historical event or moment that brings the rights of excluded others to high relief (e.g., the fall of Nazi Germany, the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, or the end of South African apartheid) the double play reenters the national drama to again justify the exclusion of some targeted group.

Vigilance, as they say, against these exclusions is in constant need. Xenophobia should be denied sanctuary. It should be chased out of from behind its nationalist mask, and its co-optation of nationalized antiracist rhetoric. Pro-immigration activism and migrant advocates in the United States have, using a variety of strategies, done and continue to do this work, but xenophobia as a target of critique should not be obscured among in general anti-racist rhetoric. Xenophobia should be, in addition to racism or racial or ethnocentric bias be identified and condemned, and its particular harms against documented and undocumented immigrants, but also citizens who are presumed-aliens, should be identified. Ignoring xenophobia for the sake of a unified, or monistic, antiracist rhetoric plays into xenophobia's double play. It also underplays how xenophobia directly affects, not only documented and undocumented immigrants, but also citizens who are presumed-aliens.

Although xenophobia is conceptually prior to nativism and in need of particular attention to counter its rise, I do not argue that the term *xenophobia* should be preferred across all contexts and groups over the utilization of the terms *racism* and *nativism*. My argument that xenophobia needs to be distinguished from racism and nativism is motivated by its particulars and likewise by the particular needs of groups affected by it. The particularism of this approach is joined with an equal appreciation for methodological pluralism. Given the particularism and pluralism of this investigation, I am reticent to insist that xenophobia is the one true label for beliefs, attitudes, and actions that involve civic ostracism. Political theorists, and more so philosophers, are no position to pontificate on what is or is not proper usage of crucial meaning-laden terms in the context of real social and political struggles. Fanon's stinging critique of professors of ethics is apropos of this situation:

For a colonized people the most essential value, because of the most concrete, is first and foremost the land: the land which will bring them bread and, above all, dignity. But this dignity has nothing to do

with the dignity of the human individual: for that human individual has never heard tell of it. All that the native has seen in his country is that they can freely arrest him, beat him, starve him: and no professor of ethics, no priest has ever come to be beaten in his place, nor to share their bread with him. As far as the native is concerned, morality is very concrete.³⁴

Fanon critiqued an abstract humanism that was a weapon in the hands of French colonialism, and, in contrast, he brought our attention to the concrete conditions of colonial oppression. His particularism influences this analysis of xenophobia, and so does his injunction that while the role of political theorists is to critique, they should do so with a listening ear to those who suffer the oppression, in this case xenophobia, that they are attempting to analyze. This analysis, therefore, is meant to be consistent with a broad array of anti-racist and anti-xenophobic strategies utilized in the effort to deny xenophobia shelter.

NOTES

1. This paper benefited from generous and critical comments from audiences at the University of Minnesota at Duluth in 2009 and at Penn State's Rock Ethics Institute's conference on "Critical Philosophy of Race: Intersections with Culture, Ethnicity, and Nationality Beyond the Black-White Binary," in 2010. The ideas in this paper were formed through many conversations with David H. Kim and are reflected in our coauthored essay "Xenophobia and Racism" (forthcoming, *Critical Philosophy of Race*). An abbreviated version of this paper appeared as Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Sheltering Xenophobia," *Global Dialogue* 12, no. 2 (2010), <http://www.worlddialogue.org/content.php?id=481>.
2. Does the majority always desire this? That is a good question, however, it is not the one I address here. This paper focuses on modern state-centered or even state-sponsored xenophobia. My point is that in our present, post-9-11 world, majorities in various nations have supported the exclusion of immigrants and those associated with immigration. For example, polls by the Pew Center for Research and the Press determined that a majority of Americans support the State of Arizona's controversial anti-immigration laws, and are conflicted about Islam and the role of Muslims in U.S. society. See "Public Supports Arizona Immigration Law," <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1591/public-support-arizona-immigration-law-poll>; and "Public Remains Conflicted Over Islam," <http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1706/poll-americans-views-of-muslims-object-to-new-york-islamic-center-islam-violence>. My narrow claim aside, xenophobia has had a long presence in the historical record. For an evolutionary approach to this issue see, Peter Turchin, *War and Peace and War: The Life Cycles of Imperial Nations* (New York: Pi Press, 2006). See also, Arne

Roets and Alain Van Hiel, "Allport's Prejudiced Personality Today: Need for Closure as the Motivated Cognitive Basis of Prejudice," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 20, no. 6 (2011). Roets and Van Hiel argue that prejudice is often motivated by the psychological need to make quick judgments rather than ideology. Whether xenophobia is rational depends on psychological and game-theoretical facts that are not the focus of this paper. However current research on psychological bias seems to show the bias against strangers is significant, and in that narrow sense xenophobia may be rational in the sense of, say, prisoners' dilemma-style games. That it might be rational does not mean that it is reasonable, especially in light of the purported values of modern Western democratic states. One may want to claim, although I think such thinking is disastrously confused, that xenophobia is justified against a general mass of people because some subset of the group (e.g., a criminal, a group of criminals, or even a militia) has inflicted harm on them. Such xenophobia may be considered reactive and would be similar to reactive racism. Any defender of an instance of reactive xenophobia would have the burden of arguing why that would be reasonable as well as rational, and more to the point why statistical stereotyping due to some xenophobic reaction justifies giving a person less than what they are morally due. On the distinction between the rational and reasonable, see Rawls, John. "The Reasonable and the Rational," *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996): 48–53.

3. These words form the banner of SIOE of England's website, <http://sioeengland.wordpress.com/>. For critical reactions to SIOE, see Soumaya Ghannoushi, "Return of the Muslim Other," *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis-free/2007/oct/24/thefarright.religion>; and the Anti-Defamation League's report on the SIOE's U.S. offshoot, "Stop the Islamization of America," http://www.adl.org/main_Extremism/sioa.htm.
4. See David H. Kim and Ronald R. Sundstrom, "Xenophobia and Racism," *Critical Philosophy of Race* (forthcoming).
5. The idea of civic ostracism as an aspect of anti-Asian American racism comes from Claire Jean Kim, "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans," *Politics & Society* 27, no. 1 (1999).
6. The focus here is on modern xenophobia that is state centered; cf. note 2.
7. Jean Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew* (New York: Schocken Books, 1948).
8. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968).
9. Ronald T. Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989); Ronald T. Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America*, rev. ed. (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown and Co., 2008); Frank H. Wu, *Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Edward J. W. Park and John S. W. Park, *Probationary Americans: Contemporary Immigration Policies and the Shaping of Asian American Communities* (New York: Routledge, 2005).
10. Linda Martin Alcoff, "Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment," in *Race*, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001).

11. The idea of national self-determination over membership is paired with a conception of national territory that ignores or is resistant to the facts and pressures of globalization. See, Saskia Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
12. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 6 and 82.
13. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 62.
14. For an introduction to philosophical debate about immigration and refugees see, Michael A. E. Dummett, *On Immigration and Refugees* (New York: Routledge, 2001); Phillip Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000); David Miller, "Immigration: The Case for Limits," in *Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*, ed. Christopher Heath Wellman and Andrew I. Cohen (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005); Christopher Heath Wellman and Phillip Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
15. The division of friend from enemy is what the controversial German jurist Carl Schmitt identified as one of the primary functions of the state. See, Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, Expanded ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
16. Jacques Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, Thinking in Action (New York: Routledge, 2001).
17. See, Senator Norm Coleman, "Restoring the Rule of Law: Eliminating Sanctuary Cities" (Aug. 27, 2007), <http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=22092>.
18. For the basic "lifeboat" argument see, Garrett Hardin, "Lifeboat Ethics: The Case against Helping the Poor," in *World Hunger and Morality*, ed. Will Aiken and Hugh LaFollette (Uppers Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1996). For a response, see Onora O'Neill, "Lifeboat Earth," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 4 (1974).
19. Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens*, The John Robert Seeley Lectures (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
20. For example, consider British National Party leader Nick Griffin's comments to that effect. See, "Sink immigrants' boats-Griffin" (8 July 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/8141069.stm.
21. Joseph Mathew et al., *Crossing Arizona* (New York: Cinema Guild, 2006), video recording. See also, Randal C. Archibald, "At the U.S. Border the Desert Takes a Rising Toll," *New York Times* (15 Sept. 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/15/us/15border.html?_r=1.
22. Laura Sullivan, "Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law," *National Public Radio* (28 Oct. 2010), <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833741>. Similar laws have spread, and are being considered by other states, and the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld its central tenet, the practice of police officers checking the immigration status of persons they have otherwise stopped and suspect of being undocumented. See *Arizona v. United States*, No. 11-182, Wednesday, 25 Apr. 2012.

23. Eric Westervelt, "In Germany, Voice Against Immigration Grow Louder," National Public Radio (19 Oct. 2010), <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130649146>.
24. Jürgen Habermas, "Leadership and Leitkultur," *New York Times*, 28 Oct. 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/opinion/29Habermas.html?scp=1&sq=Habermas&st=cse>.
25. If nationalism, including liberal nationalism, is inherently tied to ethnic and racial identity, such that all states are at bottom racial states, then my conclusion is not surprising. See for example, Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997). The claim that all Western liberal states are racial states or republics, or that liberalism is fundamentally committed to racial discrimination is a step too far for some. Formerly racial states have adopted liberal, nonracial conceptions of membership, and achieved formal and a high degree of substantial legal and political equality between its citizens. I agree with Rogers Smith that xenophobia, nativism, and racism have been endemic in liberal societies, but it is a separate stream of influence from liberal and republican influences. See, Rogers M. Smith, *Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997); and John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1955).
26. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). See also, Phillip Cole, *Philosophies of Exclusion: Liberal Political Theory and Immigration* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000).
27. Typical warnings against racism in global ethics can be found in Thomas Winfried Menko Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2008); Peter Singer, *One World: The Ethics of Globalization*, Terry Lectures (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002); David Miller, "Immigration: The Case for Limits," in *Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics*, ed. Christopher Heath Wellman and Andrew I. Cohen (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005); Christopher Heath Wellman and Phillip Cole, *Debating the Ethics of Immigration: Is There a Right to Exclude?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
28. Racism has also been weakened in this regard through skepticism and abuse; see Joshua Glasgow, "Racism as Disrespect," *Ethics* 120 (2009). See also the discussion of conceptual inflation in Lawrence A. Blum, "I'm Not a Racist, But . . .": *The Moral Quandary of Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 1–2.
29. Ronald R. Sundstrom, *The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008).
30. Leo R. Chavez, *The Latino Threat: Constructing Immigrants, Citizens, and the Nation* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Otto Santa Ana, *Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Public Discourse* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002).
31. The first form of the black-white binary is the proposition that it refers to the historical relationship between white and black racial identity in the United States.

The second form is the proposition that racial patterns can be empirically described solely using black-and-white terms. The third form of the binary is a methodological focus on blacks or whites, or on their interrelationship, to the exclusion of other ethnic or racial groups. The fourth form is the proposition that racial patterns can be described in black and white terms, because “black” and “white” pick out prescriptive patterns of racial organization. The fifth form is the proposition that disparity between blacks and whites is the U.S.’s greatest social injustice and most pressing social problem. The sixth form is the proposition that black and white conflict is the U.S.’s primary historical racial problem. Some of these forms are justified to a degree, while others are not. See, Sundstrom, *The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice*, 69.

32. George M. Frederickson. *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002). Frederickson gives an effective account in his summarization of racism, I cite it as a resource but my argument about the need to single out xenophobia does not depend on his historical narrative.
33. Amaney A. Jamal and Nadine Christine Naber, *Race and Arab Americans before and after 9/11: From Invisible Citizens to Visible Subjects*, Arab American Writing (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008); Leti Volpp, “The Citizen and Terrorist,” *UCLA Law Review* 49, no. 2 (2002); Leti Volpp, ““Obnoxious to Their Very Nature,”” *Citizenship Studies* 5, no. 1 (2004).
34. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1968), 44. I draw on his analysis of the concrete and particular, but I reject his totalizing analysis of compartmentalization that erases the distinction between the moral statuses of individuals within each compartment.