

**XENOPHOBIA  
AND RACISM**

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**Abstract**

Xenophobia is conceptually distinct from racism. Xenophobia is also distinct from nativism. Furthermore, theories of racism are largely ensconced in nationalized narratives of racism, often influenced by the black-white binary, which obscures xenophobia and shelters it from normative critiques. This paper addresses these claims, arguing for the first and last, and outlining the second. Just as philosophers have recently analyzed the concept of racism, clarifying it and pinpointing why it's immoral and the extent of its moral harm, so we will analyze xenophobia and offer a pluralist account of xenophobia, with important implications for racism. This analysis is guided by the discussion of racism in recent moral philosophy, social ontology, and research in the psychology of racism and implicit attitudes.

**Keywords:** racism; xenophobia; nativism; immigration; hospitality

## Introduction

The expanding focus on racism within academic philosophy in the United States is a positive contribution to the study of, and public discourse about, racism.<sup>1</sup> We are concerned, however, that accounts of racism tend to have a generality that obscures important particularities of group-specific types of racism: e.g., the genocide-based racism against Native Americans differs notably from the slavery-based racism against African Americans, and the racist anti-Semitism directed at Jews is distinct in expression and historical effect. Indeed we maintain that racism is more deeply tied to its context than is commonly recognized, and those contexts are significantly, even if not uniquely, national. Just as racism occurs within contexts, the obscuring of particular racisms also is contextualized, and in our age of discontent over multiculturalism and global migration, this has a profound effect on immigrants and those regarded to be foreign. Racism and bias directed toward immigrants or foreigners is lost, and sometimes intentionally so, in nationally recognized narratives of racism.<sup>2</sup>

In response to this situation, we argue that xenophobia and nativism need greater attention, but we do not stop with this emphasis. We argue that there is something peculiar to the treatment of those presumed to be alien—they are civically ostracized. It is not enough to warn intellectuals and activists of this danger and to argue for the expansion of an expert conception of racism; the specific difference that characterizes the exclusion of the presumed-alien must be thematized and criticized. This dual strategy, which involves both attention and distinction, may go hand in hand with attempts to tie anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner attitudes or beliefs to racism, as may be the case in Germany, where a nationalized rhetoric of racism tightly proscribes its history of anti-Semitism and essentially blocks most attempts to identify anti-Muslim or anti-Turkish positions as racism.

A nationalized rhetoric of racism serves nationalistic purposes. They are often antiracist because they have been informed by a nationalized narrative of the rise of racism and its partial or complete overcoming. A nationalized rhetoric of racism is distinct from mere national narratives of racism, in that the latter is about the various narratives of racism found in a nation, while the former are those dominant narratives that shape monumental history or mythistory of the nation.<sup>3</sup> In modern liberal democracies with a notable history of racism and antiracism, nationalized narratives of

racism are part of the cloth of a nation's social imagination of itself, and as such is part of the background political culture of the nation.<sup>4</sup>

Nationalized narratives of racism make nations color-blind to racist incidents that fall beyond the scope of their public conceptions of racism. This is most apparent in right-wing nationalist groups that use anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner language and then deny that they are engaging in racism. For example, the organization, Stop Islamisation of Europe (SIOE) states in 2007 on a banner on its website that "racism is the lowest form of human stupidity, but Islamophobia is the height of common sense."<sup>5</sup> SIOE has appropriated an antiracist position and then denied that its anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim message is in fact racist. Further, the image that accompanies this banner is a white hand shaking a black one. The message is this: emerging anti-Muslim attitudes do not match "our" (i.e., English or generally European) public conception of racism, and, thus, such views are not racist. Certainly, opponents of SIOE should respond by pointing out the racism of its rhetoric and uncovering its historic links to racist ideas, events, and actors. In addition, opponents of this rhetoric should criticize the conceptual and moral loophole that SIOE and its ilk exploit.

We challenge this loophole by arguing that xenophobia has at its core civic ostracism, and that this core distinguishes it from racism. Further, we argue that xenophobia is distinct from nativism but that xenophobia is at the root of nativism. We acknowledge that there are important historical and social connections that operate between xenophobia, racism, and nativism and that none of them can be fully understood in isolation from the other. The harms, however, of xenophobia can be identified, contextually understood, and condemned, and highlighting them is what is needed to keep these harms from being swallowed up by nationalized narratives of racism, particularly in the United States. We believe that distinguishing xenophobia and nativism from racism does not weaken general antiracist critiques by diverting attention to some other group, nor does it attempt to differently weigh the social importance or immorality of one type of racism over another; we believe that being more attentive to particular forms of racism, and the plural ways they are understood within affected communities, strengthens antiracist accounts and resists the conceptual homogenization of racism that may undermine the rightful claims of various groups. For example, just as nationalized narratives of racism obscure the plight of the presumed-alien, the generalization of anti-Semitism or anti-black racism loses sight of the particular harms that Jews and blacks suffer.

In part 1 of this article, we offer our definition of xenophobia as civic ostracism. We distinguish it from nativism in part 2, and then from racism in part 3. The harms of xenophobia are outlined throughout. We conclude with a discussion of the relation of xenophobia to nationalism.

### 1. Xenophobia as Civic Ostracism

The Latin term *xenophobia* straightforwardly indicates a basic idea: the fear of others, and in particular the fear of foreigners. But adhering to this etymology is inadequate and potentially misleading for the purposes of social critique.<sup>6</sup> The term's second half narrows our attention upon fear, potentially obscuring the plural beliefs and other affects associated with the phenomenon in question. Fear is not the only, or necessarily the primary, affect involved in what is picked out by "xenophobia."<sup>7</sup> For example, envy, resentment, or feelings of incongruity may be experienced first, and these may or may not precipitate fear. Despite, however, the inadequacy of its linguistic morphology, we use this term in deference to its popularity rather than invent or recycle another (for example, *misoxenony* or *heterophobia*).<sup>8</sup> In the following definition of the term, fear is not at the operational center.

#### *Civic Ostracism Defined*

On our account, the normative context for xenophobia is the ethical relations of the polity. With all its cultural, political, and economic complexity, life within groups and institutions is profoundly formative of the self. This holds as much, and often more, in the backdrop of our daily thinking and living as in the foreground. Our collective life shapes us deeply even when its elements and influence go unrecognized in the self-conception of the agent. Indeed, much of modern individualism, for better or worse, is possible precisely because of social arrangements, such as certain privileges, that facilitate it; and the denial of supporting arrangements negate the possibility of some identities, as when the systematic ignoring of civil rights protections undermines effective citizenship. Thus, on our account, xenophobia matters because group life does, and civic exclusion and subordination establishes an impoverishing, often stable, form of group life.

The United States, like many modern Western polities, has been profoundly constituted by a form of group subordination configured by the struggle between democratic and republican ideals, on the one hand, and White supremacist ideals on the other. In caricature, this struggle might be understood in terms of the demand for One Blood and for One Mind. The aim of One Blood is oriented toward the purification of the body politic from sullyng racial inferiors. The aim of One Mind seeks a single shared culture for the nation with a corresponding sense of the alienness or presumptive wrongness of other cultural forms. Sometimes, the aims of One Blood and One Mind unite, as when the polity castigates both the bodies and the values of the “heathen Chinees.” Sometimes, they conflict, as when the U.S. military in World War Two enforced racial integration in its ranks, especially between blacks and whites, in its effort to project a moral image of unity against the Axis alliance and the oppression or totalitarianism the alliance was deemed to represent. These imperatives can also reach a compromise of sorts: racialized peoples, say Latinos and Asians, may be admitted into the country up to a certain limit and welcomed on the condition that they assimilate to the cultural norms of the host nation. Xenophobia clearly, though not uniquely, expresses the One Mind imperative and can interact with the more distinctly racialized discourse of the One Blood imperative.

The principle core meaning of xenophobia is civic exclusion, or, as it will hereafter be referred to, *civic ostracism*.<sup>9</sup> This idea is centered on the notion that inclusion in the civic mainstream is a precondition for certain social goods (including officially recognized and sanctioned social relations) and is itself a good, and thus its denial through ostracism, whether intentional or neglectful, is morally condemnable. Civic inclusion is a social good because its possession gives a person the kind of agency that befits life in a modern polity and facilitates fulfillment within it. Specifically, in modern nations, denizens need to have an abiding sense of meaningful possibilities of action, identity, and relationship formation within institutions, associations, and public spheres generally, and importantly these possibilities must be, in principle, equal to those of other denizen-peers and socially accepted by a significant proportion of them. Political agency will be enhanced when this socially resonant sense of possibilities includes a sense of reasonable and fair access to goods, jobs, relationships, and statuses comparable to those of one’s peers. It should also involve a sense of legitimacy in claiming the full complement of rights that protect or enable fulfillment within the polity. Finally, it should be infused by a confidence in

the cultural legitimacy of historically non-normative identities and cultural practices.<sup>10</sup> Importantly, this is not merely an attitude or outlook of the agent. As noted, it must be socially accepted or communally sanctioned. Clearly this is crucial for the enactment of the sense of possibilities since without such acceptance or sanction others may thwart one's efforts. But it is also vital for the very formation and maintenance of that basic structure of engagement or aspiration, for there will be some sort of calibration or attunement between the agent's sense of possibilities and the kinds of approval, accommodation, or denial regularly experienced in the course of enacting that sense. Thus, the enabling sense of meaningful possibilities in a modern polity is itself a good. And, as implied, it facilitates access to other goods, even those central to political liberalism. For example, self-respect and meaningful choice have as their ordinary context such an agent sensibility being consistently, albeit imperfectly, affirmed by denizen-peers, especially during formative stages of an agent's development.<sup>11</sup>

But there is perhaps another way to make the point. Hannah Arendt famously claimed that there is an important sense in which the criminal has more rights than the refugee. Though a lawbreaker, the criminal retains some measure of rights in virtue of being a member of a given nation-state, whereas a refugee lacks concrete rights altogether in virtue of being stateless. In evaluating her provocative claim, much depends on what kind of criminal, refugee, and state is in question. The situation of the criminal may be, more or less, an abandonment by the state, and the state's ideologies may obscure this. Still, her point powerfully illustrates how there is a type of vulnerability that arises in virtue of a rightlessness born of statelessness.<sup>12</sup>

The condition of civic ostracism can be helpfully focused by using Arendt's idea as a reference point. Full civic ostracism may take the form of exile or intra-territorial sequestering, amounting to a kind of refugee rightlessness. More often, civic ostracism is, in varying degrees of intensity, some approximation of this defining extreme. One of the central ways in which xenophobia as civic ostracism is expressed is the attribution of the cultural alienness of a subject or the felt sense that the subject does not rightly belong to the nation. This raises the question of how this exclusionary outlook is linked to Arendtian statelessness. Broadly, there may be three sorts of connections. First, there may be rightful laws that are systematically misapplied to a subpopulation that is deemed to be culturally alien. Second, on the other extreme, there are morally problematic laws—like the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882—that explicitly or formally traffic in

xenophobic ideas. Third, somewhere between these poles are ideologically mystified or distinctly ambiguous laws that are facially neutral but which a critical history reveals to have been significantly implemented against culturally alien classes of people. As legal scholar, David Cole, has argued, the Alien and Sedition laws have a special susceptibility to nativistic and racialized implementation, as when more than 100,000 Japanese Americans were interned during WWII. As he explains the current massive individualized incarcerations of Muslims and Arabs after 9-11 implements the same laws and exploits the same vulnerability.<sup>13</sup> These are of course serious vulnerabilities that approximate Arendtian statelessness. But we do not want to pass over the fact that many manifestations of xenophobia take the form of ordinary exclusions, hierarchies, and indignities, based upon ascriptions of a subject not properly belonging to the civic community. These can coalesce into a xenophobic life-world.<sup>14</sup>

We are pluralists about this conception of xenophobia, and acknowledge agentive or individual forms of civic ostracism, as well as institutional forms. In the former, a belief, affect, or more generally, an attitude or even agentive orientation takes some person or group as not a proper part of one's nation. This may take the form of thinking that some person or group cannot be authentic participants in a nation's cultural, linguistic, or religious traditions, and even that they cannot be associated with the soil of the land or the blood of its people. In the latter, the institution has a collective intention or neglectful orientation that ostracizes or excludes a group from the civic mainstream. Neglectful orientation—which can be *prima facie* indicated by “disparate impact”—may be a fundamental differentiating factor for institutional as opposed to individual civic ostracism.

Apart from the accommodation of both of these forms of xenophobia, we are also pluralists in the sense that we recognize a variety of cores that may constitute agentive forms of civic ostracism. There may be cores of xenophobia other than (obviously) fear, and they may be superior for picking out xenophobia at other times or places, with their specific conditions or circumstances. Our pluralistic account entails that none of these cores are necessarily primary. Civic ostracism, nonetheless, seems to capture the fundamental operation of xenophobia in most contemporary societies.<sup>15</sup>

Civic ostracism is not the technical claim that someone does not have the legal right to be in the country, as in the case of undocumented immigrants. Nor is it the assumption that a person must be an immigrant because of some combination of their visible or cultural distinctiveness and the relative rarity of such individuals at particular sites. It is also distinct

from actual ostracization through denaturalization, stripping groups of their civic rights and expelling them from the nation. Xenophobia as civic ostracism is more generally and more fundamentally about the creation of a group-modulated *vulnerability* and the aforementioned are various ways in which this condition can be instantiated. And the polity's normative populace maintaining civically ostracizing attitudes or beliefs is an important aspect, but not the whole, of the susceptibility noted. In the United States, for example, many ethnic groups—including many with European origins—were marked as foreign, and all the nonwhite racial groups were initially ipso facto marked as civic outsiders. The civic belonging of these groups was considered to be inconceivable, so much so that their foreignness seemed perpetual. This is the point at which the inquiry “Where are you from?” is driven, not just by one's perceived being out of place—an assumption arising from statistical rarity—but from the assumption that some groups of people do not or cannot belong *here*.

Here is how Frank H. Wu characterizes the tiresome, perpetual questions that are motivated by the assumption that he, and people like him, must be foreigners:

“Where are you from? Is a question I like answering. “Where are you really from?” is a question I really hate answering.

“Where are you from” is a question we all routinely ask one another upon meeting a new person. “Where are you really from?” is a question some of us tend to ask others of us very selectively.

For Asian Americans, the questions frequently come paired like that. Among ourselves, we can even joke nervously about how they just about define the Asian American experience. More than anything else that unites us, everyone with an Asian face who lives in America is afflicted by the perpetual foreigner syndrome. We are figuratively and even literally returned to Asia and ejected from America.

Often the inquisitor reacts as if I am being silly if I reply, “I was born in Cleveland, and I grew up in Detroit,” or even if I give a detailed chronology of my many moves around the country: “I went to college in Baltimore; I practiced law in San Francisco; and now I live in Washington D.C.” Sometimes the person reacts as if I'm impertinent if I return the question, “And where are you really from?”<sup>16</sup>

Frank Wu, in the eyes of some Americans—and some outside of America too—no matter his American story, cannot be from here because

he is marked by immigration and ascribed the status of foreigner. There is little he can do to escape this ascription, so much so that his foreignness seems perpetual. As such he and others like him are not associated with this land, nation, or people, and suffer from civic ostracism.<sup>17</sup> In the United States, perpetual foreignness often is applied to Hispanics/Latinos, Asians, and Asian Americans; in Europe, it was typically affixed to the Jews and to the Roma.<sup>18</sup> It is now Arabs, Muslims, Middle Easterners, North Africans, and South Asians who additionally feel its sting in Europe and North America.

*Existential and Phenomenological Aspects of Civic Ostracism*

Civic ostracism evokes the division between the “real” and “abstract” nation that Jean-Paul Sartre theorized was endemic to anti-Semitism.<sup>19</sup> The “real” France (or America) is a “tradition and community” possessed, without the aid of merit or labor, by “true” and “good” Frenchmen (or Americans). The “real” community is a community of mediocrity. Sartre’s idea of the mediocre nation was offered as a double-entendre: the pure nation that the anti-Semites imagine is static and homogenous. The nation lacks exceptions and thus is not exceptional. Therefore, in Sartre’s criticism, anti-Semitism embraces banality and mediocrity, and the anti-Semites, themselves, are banal and mediocre in their bad faith and refusal to recognize the diverse, polyglot, and cosmopolitan nation. In contrast to the mediocre nation is the “abstract” France (or America), which is official and has been seized by a “Jew-ridden” government (or a Kenyan via Hawaii and Illinois). The anti-Semite, as is absolutely true of the xenophobe, is profoundly anti-cosmopolitan and can only approach even his nation’s metropolises with anxiety.

Likewise the perpetual foreigner syndrome illustrates what phenomenologists of race call “corporeal malediction,” the mismatch between one’s first-person experience of the body and the historical and social meaning that is laden on it by one’s condition, circumstances, and society.<sup>20</sup> In the case of the perpetual foreigner, however, there is a geographical dimension to this mismatch. One’s skin, which has either been naturalized or born here, is assumed to not belong here—in this place, in this land, within this topography. The historical and social meaning of race in a location dislocates certain bodies. We call this process “geographical malediction,” and it extends to infect assumptions about what sort of cuisines, mores, manners of dress, languages, and so on belong in the so-called real (mediocre and banal) nation.


Geographical malediction is not separate from the corporeal component, because it is a facet of the larger dynamic. Moreover, Frantz Fanon had already recognized the geographical element as a part of the structure of corporeal malediction.<sup>21</sup> This makes perfect sense in the colonial condition, but it is an aspect of Fanon's theory that has been deemphasized in discussions of racism modeled on the American black-white binary. The problem here is that "black," and in particular "African American," despite the space or hyphen between the adjective and noun, has lost its binational meaning through time: this was a major element of the meaning of being African American for late nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers, like Frederick Douglass and W. E. B. Du Bois. While African American, or a romanticized version of Native American, are considered, if you will, intra-civic terms, Asian American, and indeed Latino and Hispanic, stubbornly remains binational.

#### *Xenophobia and Racial Triangulation*

The idea of civic ostracism is clarified by Claire Jean Kim's illustration of Asian American racial triangulation.<sup>22</sup> If one imagines a graph, with the y-axis representing racial hierarchy, with "inferiority" at the origin and "superiority" at the top, and the x-axis representing civic belonging, with "foreigner" at the origin, and "insider" off to the right, then what results when considering the status of Asian Americans is a triangle of sorts (see fig. 1). On the y-axis, Asian Americans are relatively valorized above blacks but beneath whites, while on the x-axis Asian Americans are considered "foreigners," and are off to the left, and whites and blacks are off to the right safely in the "insider" domain. "Asian American" in this diagram can be replaced with other ethnic or racial groups that are subjected to civic ostracism.

Research in psychology on implicit bias lends some empirical support for the perpetual foreigner syndrome and adds an extra dimension to the process of civic ostracism.<sup>24</sup> This research has shown that some Americans have an implicit bias, either in the form of an attitude or stereotype, that Asian Americans are not associated with America or Americanness.<sup>25</sup> Other research has shown that the civic belonging of some groups, in particular those associated with Arabs, the Middle East, or Islam, is vulnerable to denigration in the minds of other Americans during moments of social and political crisis.<sup>26</sup> During times of crisis,

### Claire Jean Kim's Theory of Racial Triangulation



**FIGURE 1**  
The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans<sup>23</sup>

the implicit—as well as the explicit—attitudes of the U.S. population are susceptible to the suggestion that such threatening people do not really belong here. Xenophobia, then, is an idea associated with a distinct set of attitudes and affects, along with beliefs, that are about national inclusion and exclusion.

Importantly, while we borrow from Claire Jean Kim's work and even emphasize the use of the expression, "civic ostracism," we endorse a picture of racialization and xenophobia that is more complex than her racial triangulation model. As we see it, *both* relative valorization and civic ostracism can occur racially *or* xenophobically. That is to say, insiderness, as it were, can be phenotypically and thus racially marked, and attributions of inferiority can be xenophobically expressed as, say, contempt for another's cultural ways. Thus, what she calls civic ostracism is not only a racial component of the interracial processes she usefully describes. It can also be a nationalistic component, indeed a central one, for xenophobic processes. Xenophobia, then, has its own normative structure even as it is heavily entangled with racism in the U.S. and other polities. The racial triangulation model can accommodate much of what has been described. But we highlight both a more robust political role for practices of cultural evaluation and a more complex intersectionality in exclusionary structures of modern nation-states.

## 2. Xenophobia as Distinct from Nativism

Related to xenophobia is nativism, which of course has its own linguistic morphological problems. Nativism is sometimes the preferred term because xenophobia is regarded as too general.<sup>27</sup> John Higham's classic study of nativism in the United States, *Strangers in the Land*, has been influential in this respect because he privileges the idea of nativism in his historical analysis. Right at the place where the notion of xenophobia would be the most useful, as a concept that is fundamental to nativism, Higham dismisses it for its generality:

From the Garden of Eden to 1984, no age or society seems wholly free from unfavorable opinions on outsiders. Understood in such general terms, nativism would include every type and level of antipathy toward aliens, their institutions, and their ideas. Its beginnings in American history would date from the first Indian resistance to white intruders. This view, by reducing nativism to little more than a general ethnocentric habit of mind, blurs its historical significance.<sup>28</sup>

*Nativism*, for Higham, was a term of art that was methodologically useful for picking out a chauvinist, jingoistic, and ethnic and racially inflected American nationalism. Higham's methodological concerns shaped the discussion of xenophobia and nativism in the United States; however, that does not mean the basic idea of general antipathy toward foreigners is not worth returning to. Nativism is a useful concept and marks the point in which xenophobia is elevated to a national political project that is committed to the exclusion of groups perceived as foreign, and perhaps even to the egoistic promotion of the perceived interests of a purified nation: it is xenophobia more explicitly engaged in the defense of the nation-state. Because of its focus on polity-maintenance, and its special reference to a national context, nativism is conceptually dependent on, but also distinct from, xenophobia.

It is also worth clarifying at this point the relation between nativism and nationalized narratives of racism. We remarked that nationalized narratives of racism are used in the service of civic ostracism, by denying the connection between racism and the exclusion of presumed aliens. Likewise, such narratives may unintentionally, or even intentionally, serve nativist interests. Nations or nationalists, faced with growing concerns

over multiculturalism and migration, may attempt to officially recognize, through public rhetoric, ceremonies, and memorials, nationalized narratives of racism—to solidify them—with the intention of utilizing them as a nativist barrier.<sup>29</sup>

We recognize that either term, *xenophobia* or *nativism*, could be used as the primary word to drape the core idea of civic ostracism, but we think that it is more sensible to choose *xenophobia* because, as with Higham's recognition, it is often considered to represent the more primitive concept. So we bow to common parlance by choosing one over the other. Likewise, given nativism's ties to the modern nation-state, we can conceive of examples of xenophobia without nativism. For example, xenophobia among a diaspora or a nomadic group (and one that tends to think of itself as a civic as well as a cultural unit) may exist, but in such examples, the type of political emphasis within nativism may not make much sense. That is to say, the group may civically ostracize perceived non-members, without being able to make the nativist claim about the hoarding of national resources.

Although we think a distinction can be made between xenophobia and nativism, we do not think that this distinction need always be made. Again, our project is pluralist and pragmatic, and our aim is to aid in bringing attention to and distinguishing the particular harms suffered by presumed-alien. It may suit the purpose of different groups, or even branches of the human sciences or law, to prefer the more politically laden term *nativism*. As a pragmatic strategy for resisting xenophobia and its political and social exclusions, both terms may be effective at differing sites. Their relative effectiveness depends on their semantic appeal—their stickiness—in public debates.

### 3. Xenophobia as Distinct from Racism

Conflating racism and xenophobia for the sake of crafting a monistic conception of racism tends to ignore their particularity.<sup>30</sup> Racism is not one thing.<sup>31</sup> As a social practice embedded and embodied in particular contexts and practices, it may be useful to consider racism as one thing from the perspective of a particular disciplinary methodology. However, when we act as if it is one thing, we dilute it by undermining the appreciation of the affects and effects of its particular forms, and obfuscate xenophobia.

Various racist or xenophobic practices, as well as antiracist practices, attend to racism's different forms, or site-specific emphases, so monism runs against the grain of the conceptual pluralism in our practices.<sup>32</sup> Monism is most concerned with accounting for itself; all the same, a trans-site conception (often desired for the purposes of satisfying particular academic disciplinary foci or standards; e.g., within American analytic ethics or American urban sociology) is both enlightening and useful. Monistic accounts of racism end up revealing more about the debates within the academic disciplines they are a part of than racist or antiracist practices on the ground.

This pragmatic account, with its foci of pluralism and particularity, is consistent with acknowledging conceptual and historical intersections between racism and xenophobia; indeed, the ideas of nationalism and nationality are intertwined with race in the history of race and racism.<sup>33</sup> Since the emergence of nation-states, racism against those deemed as foreigners has taken a nationalistic character and is expressed in nativist policies. The xenophobia that results is no longer general. Instead, it is thoroughly nationalized as, if you will, a state xenophobia that is characterized by the civic ostracism of legally or juridically targeted persons.

These nationalistic expressions of xenophobia and nativism are part of this history of racism and should not be lost by the reduction of the concept to some methodologically useful generality. Racism is, according to the historian George Frederickson, a scavenger concept: it is an omnivorous thing that sucks into its maw many motivations, affects, attitudes, and beliefs.<sup>34</sup> It seemingly follows a social logic particular to the illogic of some nation or social site for a time, until conditions and interests change, and then it violently jolts and shifts. Once one thinks one has a grip on it, like a slimy creature out of some chthonic crazy-yet-real nightmare it bursts through human conflict and bafflingly attaches to targets that seemingly have nothing to do with racial difference. Therefore, distinguishing racism from xenophobia, and likewise from anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, or even from sexism and homophobia may miss racism's transmogrifications.

The lines between these categories of prejudice are ambiguous because of their significant historical and sociological relatedness and interactions. Nevertheless, there are important differences between types of prejudice and structural exclusion that need to be addressed for equally important historical, social-scientific, and practical reasons. For example, in the contemporary philosophical debate about racism, with its three models

of racism—behavioral, doxastic, and affective—the focus is on behavior, beliefs, and attitudes that focus on perceived racial difference rather than foreignness.<sup>35</sup> While the perception of racial difference is often indistinguishable from perceived foreignness, the two are not necessarily related.

Civic outsiders are not necessarily racial outsiders. Although most racial outsiders were deemed *ipso facto* to be civic outsiders, this convergence does not hold up. In the United States, for example, Native Americans and African Americans were explicitly not included in the nation. Over time, however, those groups, among others, were granted, under paternalistic and dominating conditions, a degree of civic insider status.<sup>36</sup> This insider status was, of course, limited, exploitative, and degrading: between 1890 and 1950, having a civic insider yet racial outsider status meant second-class citizenship, the denial of rights, and subjection to discrimination and racial violence with little to no legal recourse. We do not mean to make too much of this civic insider status, but to be inside is not to be outside. Moreover, civic insider status, especially for racial outsiders, is vulnerable to symbolic or sometimes legal degradation. Outsiders generally—whether they are racial, sexual, or gender outsiders—are vulnerable to selective civic ostracism, as is evident in the so-called “birther” conspiracy about President Barack Obama.<sup>37</sup> Although that conspiracy theory is laughable, palpable threats against the civil rights of citizens exist; for example, there are threats to revoke the citizenship of children born in the United States to undocumented immigrants,<sup>38</sup> and there is racial-profiling and harassment due to new strict anti-immigration laws passed by various American states.

This obfuscation brought about by monistic impulses is apparent in the relative absence of references to nativism and xenophobia in philosophical investigations of racism, particularly in the United States. The conceptual clarification and moral insight offered by philosophical analyses of racism have been refreshing and valuable, and the absence of focus on xenophobia and nativism is not a necessary result of that work. However, analytic philosophical accounts of racism have adopted the general assumption, alive in popular culture and some segments of the academy, that racism has subsumed nativism and xenophobia. In the United States, as in many other contexts, there is such a historical overlap between racist ideas and events and nativist and xenophobic ones that these ideas are codependent and at times blend into each other: the *xenos*, the others, that were excluded were also racialized, and that racial difference then served as one of the reasons offered for their exclusion. This blending has been so extensive that

some think there is no real distinction, and the different terms account for differences in emphasis.<sup>39</sup>

We disagree with this conflation. It merges racism, xenophobia, and nativism into one hyper-concept of prejudice and exclusion. There are important distinctions to be made here between prejudice against racial outsiders, civic outsiders, and the pursuit of chauvinistic ethics and racial group-interests based on claims of indigenoussness. A conception of xenophobia is needed to name and, thus, to draw attention to and discuss beliefs, attitudes, and related affects of such civic ostracism. The idea of racism, including sharpened philosophical accounts of racism, simply will not do, largely, because, civic ostracism is separable from racism. We can easily imagine someone who qualifies as a racist because they have malevolent feelings about some group, or regards them with antipathy or inferiorizes them, but nevertheless accepts them as citizens (if not equal citizens) of the United States. Imagine such a character remarking about Native Americans that, “they are savages but at least they are our savages.”<sup>40</sup> That character, in contrast, might say of the Maori “that they are savages and not our savages.”

Further, the particularity of civic ostracism and judgments of foreignness, and how those processes differently affect specific groups is lost in discussions of racism since Americans tend to focus on the history of racism between blacks and whites and the historical answers to that racism. This is so much so that even if xenophobia were a proper type of racism, its particularity would be lost in its subsumption into racism. This is due to the black-white binary and how that binary has a grip over the American social imaginary of race and racism.

#### *The Black-White Binary and the Idea of Racism in the American Social Imagination*

The social imaginary is composed of the broad concepts and ideals in our society that inform an array of particular concepts that pervade our background political culture, and are utilized and acted on by the basic structure of society. According to Charles Taylor, social imaginaries are “something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think about social reality in a disengaged mode.”<sup>41</sup> Social imaginaries name “the ways people image their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows,

the expectations that are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.”<sup>42</sup> Therefore, thinking about “racism” and “xenophobia” as concepts or folk concepts does not pick up their broad and intricate roles and functions within societies—the meaning and operations of each go beyond their conflicted and confusing definitions. An adroit account of racism would likely demonstrate how so much of what we are calling xenophobia could be accounted for by a precise definition of racism, but such accounts miss the force of practice and the semantics of xenophobia at various sites.

Thus, it is in the American social imaginary of race that the geographical malediction between America and those that suffer the stigma of being perpetual foreigners comes to life. The United States of America, with its North and South, East and West, has been historically and mythically marked as the land of the Indian, the Pilgrim and Pioneer, the African slave and emancipated black, and, inexorably, the cowboy. Thus, commentators often look back on Alex de Tocqueville’s vignette of an idyllic interaction between an Indian woman, a black woman, and a white girl as a mythistorical moment that poetically renders the nation in its fraught racial history.<sup>43</sup>

There is no denying that this is a powerful piece of monumental history or mythistory.<sup>44</sup> The black-white agonistic relationship is a central drama in American monumental history about racism and anti-racism, but the problem here is that the white-black relationship is not a good model for all American interethnic or interracial relationships. More to the point, anti-black racism is a particular form of racism and is not a good model for racism in general; likewise, anti-black racism is not a good model for prejudice in general. Too many particularities get lost in translation, for example, from anti-black racism to anti-Asian (or anti-Asian American) racism and xenophobia. The black-white binary homogenizes racism.<sup>45</sup>

#### *Particularity versus Dilution*

Concurrently, conflating xenophobia with racism, and various forms of racism with each other, sells particular forms of racism short: the nasty nooks of anti-black racism and anti-Semitism are devalued and ignored in homogenizing conflation with the racist and xenophobic experiences of other groups. Dismissive, facile comparisons of anti-black racism to the oppressive experiences of other groups—an occasional strategy of the opponents of black politics—illustrate this problem. A case in point is the example of the

apologists of the lynching of black men during Reconstruction and the Jim Crow era. Out of ignorance, insensitivity, or racism some said, “Oh, whites were lynched too.” As Frederick Douglass memorably retorted, “There are occasional cases in which white men are lynched, but one sparrow does not make a summer.”<sup>46</sup>

Psychological research in the area of implicit biases have made parallel claims, not about the black-white binary per se, but about what social psychologists call the global view of prejudice. This is a view of prejudice as a “negative” or an “unfavorable feeling toward a group and its members,” and Gordon W. Allport has been credited with its first formal formulation.<sup>47</sup> The global view of prejudice is empty of content and can theoretically be applied to any group: homosexuals, evangelical Christians, bus drivers, and so on. It, however, homogenizes what are the plural affects associated with prejudice into a general negative feeling. In doing so, it does within the mechanisms of its theory what the black-white binary does to the narrative of race and racism in the United States. In the decades following Allport’s investigation of prejudice, psychologists have uncovered a range of emotions selectively associated with distinct groups. Namely, prejudice towards groups may involve different feelings directed at different groups. The psychologists Catherine Cottrell and Steven L. Neuberg, in their study on “Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups,” put it this way:

Along with others, we propose that the traditional view of prejudice as general attitude is too gross. As our data indeed demonstrate, prejudices go beyond mere negative feelings toward groups to also reflect patterns of specific emotions—anger, fear, disgust, and the like—patterns that conventional measures of prejudice mask. This recognition is important because, as reviewed above, qualitatively different emotions tend to be associated with qualitatively different actions: People have the urge to aggress against those who anger them, escape those who frighten them, and avoid close contact with those who disgust them. Researchers who thus ignore the differences in emotion profiles elicited by different groups will have great difficulty making fine-grained predictions about intergroup behavior.<sup>48</sup>

Just as the general view of prejudice misses the various emotions (e.g., anger, disgust, fear, piety, envy, and guilt) that are experienced in differing degrees and ways towards specific groups (and sub-groups, e.g.,

white women versus white men), so do monistic accounts of racism miss the group-specific aspects of racism that are vital to understanding the experience of what is frequently called “racism” for that group. Accounts of racism need to retain the degrees and the selectivity with which racism operates across target groups, perpetrators, and sites.<sup>49</sup> Employing the idea of xenophobia addresses some of these gaps, and addresses the persistent failure to account for the experience of the condition of the perpetual foreigner and civic ostracism.

*The Pluralism of Anti-Xenophobia and Antiracism*

On top of these concerns, there are politically pragmatic reasons for turning to the rhetoric of xenophobia, and pressing for pluralist conceptions of racism, that are rooted in the practices of associations involved in antiracist and anti-xenophobic action. These groups will foster particular and overlapping conceptions of xenophobia and racism that correlate with their interests. These conceptions may not easily merge because of cross-cutting issues (classically, issues concerning gender, sexuality, class, and increasingly, immigration status, and language) that lead them to emphasize one issue over another; for example, a group that works predominantly with poor urban African Americans and Latinos may prefer a conception of racism that prioritizes institutional racism over personal racism, and thus defend the “prejudice plus power” conception of racism. Likewise, groups linked to immigrant communities may want to emphasize xenophobia and civic ostracism as they make demands, which may be marginal to other antiracist groups, in favor of bilingualism, guest-worker programs, liberalized immigration policy, including policy for the inclusion of undocumented immigrants who were brought to the United States as minors, and so on. If, as Frederickson says, racism is a “scavenger concept,” then antiracism is, as Taguieff claims, a “war machine in the everyday sky of ideologies.”<sup>50</sup>

Concern about accounting for the specific effects of xenophobia and the failure of theories of racism and prejudice under the sway of the black-white binary are methodological reasons for adopting the language of xenophobia in our discussions of racism. There are equally important normative reasons to do so that are intrinsically related to the methodological issues discussed above. First, philosophical accounts of forms of prejudice have delineated their moral, social, and political harms so as to account for the

kind and degrees of harm involved and to better state what makes those prejudices morally wrong in the first place. Philosophical accounts of racism have done a fair job of identifying the moral wrongs of racism. However, in so far as these accounts miss the moral harms of civic ostracism, and its effects on citizens as well as on immigrants and refugees, either potential or actual, they miss moral harms that parallel yet are independent of the harms of racism. For example, civic ostracism and being regarded a perpetual foreigner or probationary citizen may lead to the undermining of one's rights as a citizen (e.g., being wrongly deported) or having one's status as a legal and moral person not considered in the first place (e.g., the denial of equal protection and due process to vulnerable immigrants).

Secondly, ignoring the effects of xenophobia communicates that the exclusions that relevant groups face are not as serious as racism, or that the racism they have faced (when it looks like anti-black racism) was not as serious. For example, since Asian Americans and Latinos neither suffered enslavement in the United States, nor a campaign of lynching, as African Americans endured, some might on this basis ignore the systematic exclusion of Asians and Latinos, and the colonialism brought to their homelands, and suppose that the racism they suffered pales in comparison with the black-white story.

This is a drastic minimization of their exclusion and the prejudice they endured. Civic ostracism is central to the historical experience of many nonwhite and non-black, or pan-ethnoracial groups in the United States. In academic, and more to the point, pedagogical discussions of racism, the relevant experiences of these groups are left out, and they are left as witnesses to a white-black drama. They are sidelined in national conversations about race and racism and in the historical narrative of American pluralism. From this sideline, how can their individual or collective political interests be engaged, or their national responsibilities cued, when they are told that this singular American drama does not concern them? In contrast to narrow and restricted discussions of American ethnoracial history, alternative historical surveys and monumental histories, such as Ronald Takaki's *A Different Mirror* and *Strangers from a Different Shore*, have been extraordinarily valuable, and socially and politically engage more Americans.<sup>51</sup>

Thirdly, ignoring xenophobia contributes to the characterization of its effects, on both citizens and non-citizens, as "international" matters rather than concerns of national social justice. This in turn does two things.

It reinforces the status of the ostracized as perpetual foreigners, and it aids the retrograde and nationally self-serving manner by which the “national” is divided from the “international.” A normative loophole is then created: when thinking about social, national justice we need not care about foreign distant others. And sucked into this loophole are documented as well as undocumented residents and citizens who are presumed-alien. This is xenophobia’s double play, and critical philosophy of race should not assist this process of normative marginalization and civic exclusion.

#### NOTES

We are grateful for the generous and critical comments from audiences at Penn State’s Rock Ethics Institute conference “Critical Philosophy of Race: Intersections with Culture, Ethnicity, and Nationality beyond the Black/White Binary,” in 2010, and a conference on racism and xenophobia at the University of San Francisco in 2012. We would also like to thank the audience at the University of Minnesota at Duluth in 2009, at the Institute for Philosophy at the University of Hildesheim in 2012, and at the Annual Conference of the Society for Applied Philosophy in 2013 for their comments. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Joshua Glasgow for his comments and criticisms on an earlier version of this article, to Yoko Arisaka for sustained discussion, and to Neema Jyothiprakash for her editing and work as a research assistant. Finally, we thank our anonymous reviewers for their insightful remarks.

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1. Lawrence A. Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But . . .” *The Moral Quandary of Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Jorge L. A. Garcia, “The Heart of Racism,” *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (1996): 5–45; and Ladelle McWhorter, *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America: A Genealogy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
2. This neglect does not extend to historical, sociological, or legal scholarship in the United States, or to philosophy in Europe. It is largely present in American philosophical discussions of racism. Important exceptions to this neglect include Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *The Anatomy of Prejudices* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); David Theo Goldberg, *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990); and *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
3. William Hardy McNeill, *Mythistory and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 1980).
4. See, for example, the use that John Rawls makes of the idea of the background political culture in his theory of justice. John Rawls and Erin Kelly, *Justice as*

*Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001). For more on the idea of social imaginaries, see Charles Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006).

5. These words form the banner of SIOE of England's website, <http://sioeengland.wordpress.com/>. See "Sheltering Xenophobia" for further discussion of this example.
6. See the related discussion of "homophobia" in Jorge L. A. Garcia, "The Heart of Racism," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 27 (1996): 5–45. His point is that the notion of homophobia is used to pick out a variety of attitudes about lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals that have nothing to do with fear or hatred. *Homophobia*, then as a term may beg the moral question about anti-LGBT attitudes. He would favor a term that did not beg the question and that picked out homosexual hatred rather than general opposition to homosexual acts or attitudes—what others may call a "lifestyle" or more accusingly an "agenda." In contrast to Garcia's position, we do not endorse the dismissal of the concept of homophobia in favor of a concept of hatred of homosexuals, because it does not account for everyday intuitions about homophobia, and the full spectrum of its use, especially by LGBT people and LGBT-rights advocates. There are three language-fixing elements here: (1) the phenomenon itself; (2) common use; and (3) use by a special authoritative subclass of persons, namely LGBT folks themselves or activists for LGBT interests. So there may be a ships-passing-in-the-night problem here. In our use, outside of any particular affect, the term applies to the denials of protections from sexuality-based discrimination and of rights granted to heterosexuals, such as marriage and divorce (recognition by religious institutions is a different matter), parental rights and access to adoption, and non-discrimination in employment (i.e., in the branches of the U.S. Department of Defense).
7. Nor is it necessarily a part of a speaker's meaning. It seems fairly widely understood that the focus on fear is largely an etymological artifact. It would be difficult to differentiate folk and expert senses of the word's meaning, since in the U.S. *xenophobia* is an uncommonly used, even if familiar, word in political discussion.
8. The non-insistence on literal translation is justified by ordinary shifts in usage. Demanding that *xenophobia* simply mean the phobia of some *xenoi* ignores historical shifts in usage. Although Garner does not discuss the term in his usage guide, his discussion of usage and linguistics is helpful in thinking about this issue; see, Bryan A. Garner, *Garner's Modern American Usage*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).
9. The phrase "civic ostracism," as used in this sense is from Claire Jean Kim's excellent essay, "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans," *Politics & Society* 27, no. 1 (1999). Our view of xenophobia as civic ostracism was also influenced by David Theo Goldberg's *Racist Culture*, 90–116; Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein's *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (New York: Verso, 1991); and Pierre-André Taguieff's *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and its Doubles, Contradictions* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).

10. A complication here is that not all identities or rituals deserve civic inclusion, like those involved in Nazism. And this issue of where to draw the line must be addressed at some point. Still, it seems clear that there are cultural ways, like those of, say, Buddhism or Confucianism, that are a far cry from Nazism, to which this discussion is salient.
11. This emphasis on mutual recognition or affirming attunement places our position in the ballpark of Hegelian-inspired accounts. See, for example, Axel Honneth, *Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (Malden, MA: Wiley Press, 2008).
12. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951; repr., San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), 269–302. A relevant case that subverts the idea that criminals get superior treatment because they are civically included, are those cases of criminals that are grouped in-kind with noncitizens because of their ethnicity or race. See, for example, the treatment of Latino prisoners by the notorious Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the sheriff of Maricopa County, AZ: Terry Carter, “The Maricopa Courthouse War,” *ABA Journal* 96, no. 4 (Apr. 2010): 43–49.
13. See David Cole, *Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the War on Terrorism* (New York: New Press, 2003). See also the stronger claims made in Falguni Sheth’s important work, *Toward a Political Philosophy of Race* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).
14. The project of this paper has some structural parallels to important work by Cheshire Calhoun on the nature of lesbian and gay subordination. On her account, such subordination is specially configured by lesbianism and homosexuality being structurally displaced from civil society. See her *Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). We thank her for her discussion of this project.
15. This is a pluralist or disjunctive conception of xenophobia and it correlates with similar conceptions of racism. For a defense of a monistic conception of racism, see Joshua Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” *Ethics* 120 (2009): 64–93. Disjunctive accounts of racism remain open to the discovery of new cores. Rather than being a weakness, this allows conceptions of racism to track changes in its expression. Nevertheless, an ethical conception of racism, informed by the priorities of philosophical ethics, is vital, especially for the purposes of public morality in politically liberal societies. Glasgow’s view of racism as disrespect gets at the central moral problem with racism. However, public ethical conceptions of the immorality of racism will conflict with conceptions of racism (and for that matter xenophobia, sexism, or homophobia) that arise from various conceptions of the good. They also remain vulnerable to the problems with monistic accounts of prejudice that are discussed in this paper. We do not claim that racism and xenophobia are separate social phenomena; instead, as it is often said of these things, they intersect. All the same, we can develop a distinct conception of each to identify their particular operations. Likewise, we are concerned about narrative and the effect of monistic narratives of racism on debates about public morality

- over such things as xenophobia and immigration, as well as the lives of citizens who are marked as foreigners.
16. Frank H. Wu, *Yellow: Race in America Beyond Black and White* (New York: Basic Books, 2002).
  17. This has a bearing on the psychic life and assimilation travails of those deemed to be foreign. See David H. Kim "Shame and Self-Revision in Asian American Assimilation," in *Living Alterities*, ed. Emily S. Lee (Albany: SUNY Press, forthcoming).
  18. Ronald T. Takaki, *Strangers from a Different Shore: A History of Asian Americans* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989); *A Different Mirror: A History of Multicultural America* (New York: Back Bay Books/Little, Brown, 2008).
  19. Jean Paul Sartre, *Anti-Semite and Jew* (New York: Schocken Books, 1948).
  20. Linda Martín Alcoff, "Toward a Phenomenology of Racial Embodiment," in *Race*, ed. Robert Bernasconi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 267–83. The phenomenological analysis, of course, concerns intersubjective recognition, a process that is at once perceptual and normative, but at this stage in the analysis we are most concerned with the perception of others.
  21. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952; repr., New York: Grove Press, 2008). One could extend this critique to include linguistic malediction.
  22. Kim, Claire Jean "The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans," *Politics & Society* 27, no. 1 (1999): 105–38.
  23. This closely replicates the figure presented in Clare Jean Kim's article. An arrow has been added for emphasis.
  24. For a brief explanation of implicit bias, and its two forms, implicit attitudes and stereotypes, see Brian A Nosek and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "Implicit Attitude," in *Oxford Companion to Consciousness*, ed. Tim Bayne, Axel Cleeremans, and Patrick Wilken (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 84–85. See also, the website for Project Implicit, <https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/>. The importance of this and other psychological research for the philosophy of race is indispensable. See Luc Faucher and Edouard Machery, "Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 39, no. 1 (2009): 41–62.
  25. Thierry Devos and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "American = White?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, no. 3 (2005): 447–66.
  26. Qiong Li, and Marilyn B. Brewer, "What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity after 9/11," *Political Psychology* 25, no. 5 (2004): 727–39; Catherine A. Cottrell, and Steven L. Neuberg, "Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups: A Sociofunctional Threat-Based Approach to 'Prejudice,'" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, no. 5 (2005): 770–89.
  27. Juan F. Perea, *Immigrants out!: The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States* (New York: New York University Press, 1997). See, in particular, Linda S. Bosniak, "'Nativism' The Concept: Some Reflections," in *Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States*, ed. Juan F. Perea (New York: New York University Press, 1987).

28. John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1955), 3.
29. See for example, the discussion of German anti-Semitism versus opposition to multiculturalism in Thilo Sarrazin, *Deutschland Schafft Sich Ab: wie Wir Unser Land Auf's Spiel Setzen*, 10. Aufl. ed. (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2010).
30. We want to emphasize that this is a possibility rather than a necessity, but it is a condition monistic theoretical accounts of racism encourage and have a hand in. Most monistic accounts in fact neglect the particularities of racism. This is due to the level of abstraction the projects are involved in. However, this results in (1) decontextualization, which makes the local value of the abstraction questionable, and (2) participation in the current and dominant social imaginary of race and racism that draws on and favors examples and stories that fit into nationalized narratives of racism. The cases we reference involve philosophical analyses of racism in the United States, which typically contribute to the black-white binary. It is important to point out that this type of monism does not support antiracism against anti-black racism; rather, it dilutes our understanding of anti-black racism by losing sight of its particulars in favor of generalities that are, in the end, not generally applied.
31. This is a serious charge that runs counter to recent trends in philosophic analyses of racism, although it is consistent with past accounts of racism in philosophy, especially those not focused exclusively on the United States. See, for example, David Theo Goldberg's *Racist Culture*. Our claim is strictly pragmatic, and we are agnostic about the social ontological status of racism or its fundamental normative meaning—we are agnostic about the core components of the concept of racism. Rather, this paper is focused on xenophobia and provides an argument for a pragmatic, pluralistic account of racism by demonstrating how subsuming xenophobia and nativism into accounts of racism obfuscates the latter. It is also important to note that this view does not preclude the possibility that at some sites racism and xenophobia share civic ostracism as a core meaning, or that they interact on some sort of spectrum of prejudice or exclusion. Our pluralism on this question was influenced by Pierre-André Taguieff, *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and Its Doubles* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
32. Taguieff, *The Force of Prejudice*.
33. David Theo Goldberg, *The Racial State* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Press, 2002); Anthony W. Marx, *Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (New York: Verso, 1991).
34. George M. Frederickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), 22.
35. Jorge L. A. Garcia, "The Heart of Racism"; Blum, "I'm Not a Racist, But . . ."; Luc Faucher and Edouard Machery, "Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism."
36. The idea that Native Americans and African Americans are civic insiders is common and explicitly held. The implicit (unconscious) attitudes and stereotypes of

- some Americans reveal, however, that depending on the context African Americans are thought to be less, and sometimes more, American than white Americans. See, Thierry Devos and Mahzarin R. Banaji, "American = White?," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 88, no. 3 (2005): 447–66.
37. For an outline of the conspiracy and the administration's response, see the *New York Times* topic page, [http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/birther\\_movement/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=birther&st=cse](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/b/birther_movement/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=birther&st=cse); and Factcheck.org's statement, <http://factcheck.org/2008/08/born-in-the-usa/>.
  38. "Xenophobia: Fear-Mongering for American Votes," *New York Times* (5 Aug. 2010), [http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/opinion/06fri1.html?ref=fourteenth\\_amendment](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/06/opinion/06fri1.html?ref=fourteenth_amendment). Brooke Kirkland, "Limiting the Application of Jus Soli: The Resulting Status of Undocumented Children in the United States," *Buffalo Human Rights Law Review* 12 (2006): 197–221.
  39. Ian Haney-López, *White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race*, rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 2006).
  40. As we said above, the civic-insider but racial/ethnic-outsider status cannot be ascribed rigidly or ahistorically; our aim is primarily to explain this distinction. Further this is just an example of a proposition that would make sense in the United States, given its romanticized vision of early Native Americans, and is not meant to make a conclusive point about the civic status of Native Americans in the history of Colonial America or the United States of America. The history of the civic status of Native Americans in the United States has real complexity; see Wilkins, David E. *American Indian Politics and the American Political System* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011).
  41. Charles Taylor, *Modern social imaginaries* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 24.
  42. Ibid.
  43. Alexis de Tocqueville, Harvey Claflin Mansfield, and Delba Winthrop, *Democracy in America*, ed. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 306.
  44. See above note 4.
  45. The black-white binary also homogenizes, or conflates, the process of racial formation of each group, their ethnic or racial experiences, and their solutions.
  46. Frederick Douglass, "Address to the People of the United States," in *Frederick Douglass: Selected Speeches and Writings*, ed. Frederick Douglass, Philip Sheldon Foner, and Yuval Taylor (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1999), 674.
  47. Cottrell and Neuberg, "Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups." For a summary of findings in the psychology of prejudice since Allport, see John F. Dovidio, Peter Samuel Glick, and Laurie A. Rudman, *On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005).
  48. Cottrell and Neuberg, "Different Emotional Reactions to Different Groups," 786.
  49. Blum, "I'm Not a Racist, But . . ."
  50. Frederickson, *Racism*, 22; Taguieff, *The Force of Prejudice*, 9.
  51. See above note 19.